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1 For example, as one veteran commentator on Russian privatization notes: “The
fundamental issue is . . . not primarily macroeconomic.  All along, Russia has suffered from
serious problems in corporate governance.”  Anders Aslund, A Crisis of Confidence,
MOSCOW TIMES, June 3, 1998; see also  OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
1997-1998, at 129-35 (listing “barriers to restructuring and investment: corporate
governance, capital markets, the tax system, and regional protectionism”).
2 Gary Peach, An Outstanding Year Despite Market Narrowness, MOSCOW TIMES,
Jan. 13, 1998, available in Nexis Library, Curnws File.  This peak represented an eleven-fold
improvement over 1994, when total stock market capitalization, based on voucher auctions
prices, was under $12 billion.  M. BOYCKO, A. SHLEIFER & R. VISHNY, PRIVATIZING RUSSIA
117 (1995).  By the summer of 1998, “the Moscow Times index of 50 leading shares hit an
all-time bottom, lower than its starting level four years ago.”  Katy Daigle, Bill Improves
Shareholder Rights in Russia, MOSCOW TIMES, July 14, 1998.  See, e.g., Patricia Kranz, Fall
of an Oligarch, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 1, 1999, at 44 (“From its peak in October, 1997, the
market capitalization of [ ] three big industrial holdings – Sidanko Oil, Svyazinvest
Telecommunications, and Norilsk Nickel – has dropped from about $31 billion to $3.8
billion.”). 
LESSONS FROM FIASCOS 
IN RUSSIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Merritt B. Fox and Michael A. Heller*
INTRODUCTION
Russian industry has performed poorly since privatization.  The voluminous
literature on transition economies explains this poor performance primarily in terms
of continued bureaucratic meddling, poor macro-economic and tax policy, and
low human capital.  Problems in corporate governance are often mentioned as
well,1 but little analyzed.  The goal of this paper is to open the black box of “poor
corporate governance” by detailing its consequences for the Russian economy and
by tracing its causes to the initial structure of Russian privatization.  Understanding
what went wrong in Russia teaches lessons not only for transition policy, but also
for corporate governance theory generally.
After the fall of Russian communism, state enterprises were rapidly
privatized, stock markets created, and a corporate legal code adopted.  However,
even at its peak before the 1998 collapse, the total stock market capitalization of
all Russian industry only reached about $130 billion – less than Intel Corp.2  In
early 1999 the numbers were “phenomenally abysmal; if they could sink any
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3 Gary Peach, Poor Management Destroys Sberbank, Tatneft, MGTS, MOSCOW
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998.
4 Put another way, as measured by stock prices, a barrel of proven oil reserves
owned by a Russian oil company was worth about one twentieth of a similar barrel owned
by a Western oil company counterpart. BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra  note *, at 120;
Das Kapital Revisited, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 1995, at 15 (“[A] barrel of oil in the ground
owned by a Russian company is  worth 10 cents.  A barrel owned by a western company
is worth $5.50.”).
further, shares would literally have a value of zero.  As it is, the entire market is
made up of penny stock.”3  These numbers represent a trivial fraction of the
apparent value of the underlying corporate assets controlled by Russian
corporations.4  The low prices reflect severe corporate governance problems,
including the high probability that the firms’ underlying assets will be grossly
mismanaged and that whatever cash flow is produced will be diverted to benefit
insiders or reinvested in unproductive projects.  In this paper, we focus on two
questions:  What are the consequences of these corporate governance problems
for the real economy in Russia? Why are these problems so widespread and
persistent?
To answer the first question, we define corporate governance in a way that
looks to the economic functions of the firm rather than to any particular set of
national corporate laws.  Firms exhibit good corporate governance when they both
maximize residuals and, in the case of investor owned firms, make pro rata
distributions to shareholders.  Bad corporate governance is just the failure by a
firm to meet one or both of the above conditions.  Whether managers operate their
firms in ways that meet these ideals depends on the structure of constraints and
incentives in which they operate, a structure that depends in part, but only in part,
on the prevailing legal system.  In this paper, we give more precision to the idea
of “bad” corporate governance by developing a typology of the kinds of damage
to the real economy that loosely constrained, poorly incentivized managers can
inflict.  We identify, with examples, why this damage has been particularly severe
in Russia.
As for the second question, we go beyond standard causal explanations of
poor corporate governance, which include the low level of corporate
transparency, lack of effective adjudication of corporate law violations, weak
enforcement of judgments, and the absence of a network of trust among Russian
businessmen, factors that are common to all post-socialist corporate economies.
We expand this inquiry by focusing on the role of initial conditions – specifically,
the initial boundaries of privatized firms and the initial allocation of firm shares to
insiders – and the bargaining dynamics that have followed.  Our focus helps
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5 See, for example, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999).
explain why Russian corporate performance remains so much worse than in other
transition countries.
Our analysis is not confined to the Russian experience alone, rather it
provokes rethinking of corporate governance theory more generally.  Though our
typology emerges from study of Russian corporate fiascos, it has larger
applicability – linking corporate governance failures to real economy effects in a
more comprehensive way than we have found in the existing literature.  We
provide an analytic tool that helps identify vulnerabilities to particular corporate
governance problems in any economy and points toward more tailored policy
responses.  Our work on initial conditions also has more general applicability.  The
existing scholarly literature on comparative corporate governance reflects the range
of firm boundaries and dominant shareownership patterns in the United States,
Western Europe and Japan.  The Russian experience falls, at least initially, outside
this range and hence suggests useful lessons about the roles that firm boundaries
and ownership structure may play in corporate governance theory, lessons that
may benefit Russia, other countries in transition, and even the United States.
Part I defines bad corporate governance and, using Russian examples,
develops a typology of its consequences for the real economy.  Part II describes
the initial conditions of Russian privatization and shows how they continue to cause
corporate governance failures.  Part III concludes.
I.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURES IN RUSSIA
A.  A Simple Definition
Everyone in the transition economy debate talks about the importance of
“good corporate governance,” but no one quite specifies what it means.  What
little commentary  does exist tends to focus on some idealized set of corporate law
rules.5  In contrast, we measure the quality of corporate governance in terms of the
social welfare impact of firm decision-making. We make no prejudgments about
which institutional arrangements would work best in any particular country.  Under
our definition, good corporate governance requires two things:  managers
must maximize their firm’s residuals and firms, at least investor owned firms,
must distribute those residuals on a pro-rata basis to shareholders.  Let us
consider each element in turn.
The first key feature of a well-governed firm is that its managers make
decisions that seek to maximize the residuals that the firm generates over time,
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6 See generally HENRY  HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP  OF ENTERPRISE (1996).
7 Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L. J. 1197 (1984) (discussing
problems created by multiple classes of residual claimants).
8 We make the standard assumptions that the firm purchases its inputs and sells
its outputs in competitive markets and that there are no important externalities or subsidies
not because we believe they are consistently true in Russia or any other country – clearly
they are not.  We make these assumptions because they allow us to focus on the social
welfare effects of things that go on within the firm in reaction to the constraints imposed
directly by the legal system and by the firm’s markets for inputs, outputs and capital.  Such
a focus allows us to separate out more precisely the different problems in the Russian
economy.  Thus these assumptions  allow for more precise policy analysis.  Their standard
nature also makes it easier to draw larger corporate governance lessons  from the Russian
experience since most analyses of corporate governance problems in other countries make
the same assumptions.
discounted to present value.  Residuals are defined as the difference between what
a firm pays at contractually pre-determined prices to obtain its inputs and what it
receives for its output.  We define this criteria in terms of residual maximization
rather than share value maximization because we do not want to foreclose the
possibility that labor or consumer owned firms would not be optimal in certain
situations.6  In an ordinary investor-owned corporation, however, the residuals go
to shareholders who provide the firm’s equity-based capital, which is the only
input not obtained at contractually pre-determined prices.  Thus, for such a firm,
maximizing share value is equivalent to maximizing its residuals.7
The conclusion that it is socially desirable for a firm to maximize its residuals
flows from the assumption, which is standard in simple models of the corporation,
that the firm purchases its inputs and sells its outputs in competitive markets and
there are no important externalities or subsidies.  Thus, the contractually pre-
determined prices the firm pays for its inputs (other than its equity-based capital)
are equal to the value of what the firm takes from society; similarly, the firm’s
selling prices for its output equals the value of what it gives to society.  Maximizing
the difference in value between inputs and outputs maximizes the firm’s
contribution to society and hence constitutes efficient behavior.8
In the case of an ordinary investor-owned firm, the second feature of good
governance is that the residuals are in fact distributed to shareholders and in
a pro-rata fashion.  Meeting this second condition is not strictly necessary for one
period, static efficiency.  For a single period, all that is necessary is that the
residuals be maximized, whoever then receives them.  The pro-rata distribution
condition is helpful, however, in achieving the efficient allocation of resources over
time because pro-rata distribution greatly increases the ability of firms to raise
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9 The mix corporate governance problems may be difficult to tease apart.  For
example, one commentator notes, “problems range from murder to bad market trends, but
all boil down to basic corporate governance: Directors and their cohorts appear to have
milked or outright plundered the companies to the detriment of any outside shareholders,
real or potential.”  Mark Whitehouse, The Other Side of the Room, MOSCOW TIMES, Sept.
16, 1997. When insiders gut a firm, they could be failing to maximize residuals according to
several of the pathologies we identify as well as making non pro-rata distributions.
capital by issuing new equity.
For a firm to raise capital by selling equity at a price worthwhile to its
owners, a firm needs credibly to promise to abide by both principles of good
corporate governance – that the firm will strive to maximize its future residuals and
shareholders will receive some determinable proportion of these residuals as
dividends or other distributions.  The expectation of receiving such distributions is
what makes holding a share worthwhile as a financial instrument and what induces
outsiders to provide cash in return for shares.  A firm can make itself credible in
several ways:  by developing a record of abiding by its promises, by being subject
to a binding legal system, and by structuring incentives so managers gain if they
fulfill their promises and suffer otherwise.  If a firm acts contrary to its promises,
it undermines its own record and becomes less able to acquire new equity
financing.  Note, also, that when a legal system fails to punish such a firm, an
individual firm’s decision to break its promises imposes externalities:  investors
become generally less willing to buy equity of other firms governed by the same
legal system, in other words weak corporate governance in existing firms poisons
the well for new firms which hope to use equity markets.
Defective corporate governance means that a firm does not meet one or
both elements of our definition.  Most attention in reports on transition economies
has focused on problems relating to non pro-rata distributions: for example, when
insiders dilute shares of outsiders, loot companies, fail to pay dividends, and
engage in many other tactics that deprive outside shareholders of their pro-rata
share of the wealth generated by the firm.9  Non pro-rata distributions do indeed
help explain low stock prices and the poor performance of the corporate sector.
But failure to maximize residuals has the same effect, indeed even more directly.
The vast transition literature never makes clear which failure dominates in any
particular enterprise fiasco.  Instead, bad corporate governance becomes a catch-
all for problems that should be understood as being quite distinct.  Pinning down
these distinctions should help when we come to prescribing policy cures.  
A cautionary methodological note is in order at the outset, however. The
study of corporate governance in Russia is hampered by two problems. First,
serious firm level econometric study of corporate governance changes in Russia
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10  See Luigi Zingales, The Value of a Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock
Exchange, 7 REV. ECON. STUDIES 125 (1994) (Suggesting that the huge control premium for
shares of Italian firms shows a poor corporate governance regime).
11 Note, we continue to assume that the firm purchases its inputs and sells its
outputs in competitive markets and that there are no important externalities or subsidies.
Therefore, the firm’s input costs should reflect the social opportunity costs of continued
operation and output prices the social benefits of production.
is difficult or impossible because meaningful hard data on enterprise behavior is
hard to come by.  Firms do not publish serious accounts of their own performance
because managers hide their own ongoing thefts of firm assets from outside
shareholders and from others who would seek to steal those assets themselves,
including labor and the mafia.  Also, back tax debts, which pervade the corporate
sector, mean that any reported income may be seized, making the effective tax rate
100 percent.  So most income statements and balance sheets are fictional, making
it difficult or impossible to undertake serious firm level econometric study of
corporate governance changes.  Second, econometric work testing propositions
about corporate governance based on country level comparisons of economic
performance is difficult as well.  Good corporate governance is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for achieving a developed capitalist economy, it simply
helps.  Italy, for example has a vibrant economy even though the governance of its
corporations would generally fall far short of the standards set out here.10  Russia,
in contrast, would likely continue to languish economically absent solving some of
its other pressing problems even if its firms all fully met these standards.  The
sample size of countries is small relative to all the other factors that affect national
economic performance.  These two problems mean that we are left with anecdotal
accounts and surveys as our main sources of empirical information.  These sources
involve their own biases; nevertheless, they suggest a reasonably coherent picture.
Informing this picture with theory tells what we believe to be a convincing story.
B.  The Failure to Maximize Residuals
We can identify five distinct pathologies indulged in by loosely constrained,
poorly incentivized managers that result in firms failing to maximize residuals.11  We
focus first on this prong of bad corporate governance because it is crucial to
explaining why insiders do not operate their firm even to maximize their own joint
benefit, an important issue we take up in Part II.B.  As we shall see, the initial
structure of ownership makes Russian firms particularly vulnerable to exhibit these
corporate governance pathologies.  When the initial ownership structures intersect
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12  More precisely, for a firm to fall into this category, two requirements must be met.
First, the social benefit from the firm’s output in the current period must be less than the
social cost of its inputs.  Second, after comparing for each subsequent period the social
benefits and costs, and discounting the difference to present value, the aggregate of these
discounted differences must be either negative or, if positive, less than the deficit in the
current period.  In terms of current operations, this assumes that the firm operates at lowest
possible cost for the level of output chosen and that it chooses the level of output that will
maximize  its  residuals.  In terms of decisions made in the current period that affect future
periods, this assumes that the firm follows an optimal investment policy, which commonly
would be undertaking no investment at all.
13 Maura Reynolds, A Russian Company Town’s Miracle, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999,
at A1.
with untenable firm boundaries, the pathologies we identify here become even
more intractable.
Pathology 1:  Continued Operation of Value-Destroying Firms. — Any
economy has some unreformable value destroying firms that should be shut down
immediately.  Continued operation of these firms, even if undertaken as efficiently
as possible, represents a negative net present value decision from a social point of
view: operation in the current period results in a social loss too great to be offset
by social gains, if any, from continued operation in subsequent periods.12  Despite
the social harm, institutional arrangements in an economy may nevertheless permit
such a firm to continue operating.  For example, in Russia, consider the case of the
Tutayev Engine Factory, which continues to operate despite the plant manager’s
estimate that “it costs the plant about 1.33 rubles to produce about 1 ruble in
output.”13  In the case of many unreformable value destroying firms, poor
corporate governance is the main cause of their continued operation, hence the
reason for identifying this problem as the first type of potential corporate
governance pathology.  Firm managers wish for continued operation so they can
hold onto their jobs and associated perquisites.  Because they are not constrained
by effective corporate governance mechanisms, the managers get their way.  In
other cases though, good corporate governance is not necessary to shut down a
firm that should in fact be closed.  And in yet other cases, good corporate
governance is a necessary but not sufficient condition to close the firm.  Making
these distinctions is important for good policy making.  
a. When is corporate governance relevant?  Retain the assumption for
a moment that an unreformable value destroying firm purchases inputs and sells
outputs in competitive markets, that there are no important externalities, and that
credit and other finance is extended to firms only on a reasonably informed,
rational basis.  Even with no new investment, such a firm’s ordinary operations
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14 WORLD BANK: RUSSIA HOUSING SECTOR REFORM, 1994 (land chapter).
result in a negative cash flow in the current period (one that is sufficiently negative
that expected future cash flow, discounted to present value, would, even if
positive, be unable to offset).  The firm would thus lack enough current cash flow
to purchase the inputs its needs to continue production and would lack cash flows
in the future to use as a basis to obtain credit or other finance sufficient to cover
this deficit.  
The importance of corporate governance here depends entirely on whether
the firm has any cash reserves or assets with significant salvage value.  Without
reserves or salvageable assets, the firm would be forced to close immediately
regardless of how much its managers want to continue operations and regardless
of how ineffective existing corporate governance mechanisms were in restraining
them.  Russia’s generally outmoded capital stock implies that many firms lack
assets with any significant salvage value.  There is also a general cash shortage.
Thus, absent subsidies and problems in the way credit is extended, many firms
whose continued operation is value destroying would shut down promptly even
though the corporate governance regime is highly ineffective.  Neither improved
corporate governance nor an effective bankruptcy regime is necessary to eliminate
such firms.  
On the other hand, for firms with reserves or salvageable assets, effective
corporate governance is necessary to shut down the firm immediately.  Otherwise
managers can indulge their desires to continue the operation.  Where cash reserves
are available, the cash can be used directly to buy the needed inputs.  Where the
firm has salvageable assets, cash can be raised by selling the assets or using them
as a basis for gaining credit.  Many value-destroying Russian firms do have assets
with significant salvage value.  Manufacturing businesses, for example, are often
located inside large cities on real estate with far more value in other uses.14  If the
firm has a negative cash flow, its managers may nevertheless be able to keep
operating by cashing out the salvage value of these assets to acquire needed
inputs.  Even with a positive cash flow, closing the firm may be socially desirable
once the rental value of the land is properly counted as an opportunity cost. 
b.  The role of subsidies and inappropriate credit and finance.  Now
drop the assumptions made above concerning subsidies, credit and finance.
Where there is a subsidy, or credit or finance is extended on other than a
reasonably informed and rational basis, a firm can have a positive cash flow even
though the social benefit from the firm’s output can be less than the social cost of
its inputs.  Under such circumstances, the firm’s continued operation, even though
involving a social loss, can be perfectly consistent with maximizing residuals.
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15 For purposes of this analysis, workers can be considered involuntary creditors,
however, only for the wage arrears that have accumulated during the period before
sporadic wage payment became their firm’s ordinary and usual behavior.  Once the pattern
of sporadic payment becomes expected and there is no reasonable prospect that the arrears
are going to be paid, the practice is more appropriately viewed as a de facto wage
reduction.  At that point, the decision of workers to stay in the firm’s employment suggests
that the alternatives available to them were no more desirable.  Thus the de facto lower
level of wages is presumably a reasonable measure of the social opportunity cost of their
labor.  
16 The Soviet Union built its whole manufacturing sector based upon energy
resource subsidization.  These subsidies continue to a considerable extent even today
through provision of these resources at prices below the world level, a fact that is
somewhat disguised by the prevalence of barter transactions.  Most of the firms that
resulted from the privatization of this sector would be unprofitable in an open economy.
[cite to Barry Ickes Foreign Affairs article]
Corporate governance mechanisms that push a firm’s managers to maximize
residuals will not by themselves lead to the socially desirable result of closing down
these firm.  Indeed, for firms without reserves or salvageable assets, the quality of
corporate governance is not even relevant.  Such firms will be shut down,
regardless of the quality of corporate governance, if and only if the subsidies or
inappropriate credit provision is ended.
Russia continues to provide many subsidies, particularly in the energy area.
Also, the system by which input suppliers are paid, often involving barter, is highly
chaotic, implying that credit is often not extended in a rational, well informed
fashion.  And workers have often become involuntary creditors when firms do not
pay them and let back wages arrears pile up.15  All this suggests that many Russian
firms are continuing to operate that should be shut down immediately – but
improved corporate governance will not, or will not by itself, solve the problem.
Instead, elimination of subsidies and improvement of the credit process are the
relevant reforms.  
In sum, Russian firms that should be shut down immediately fall into three
groups.  The first are firms with no cash reserves or assets with significant salvage
value and which benefit from no subsidies or unsuitable credit extensions. These
firms are presumably closing on their own, no matter how bad their corporate
governance mechanisms.  The second group are firms with no cash reserves or
assets with significant salvage value but which do benefit from subsidies or
unsuitable credit extensions.  Given the pervasiveness of these problems in the
economy, particularly the provision of energy at below world market prices, this
second group may be much larger than the first.16  If the subsidy and credit
problems are effectively addressed, these firms will close promptly but not before.
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17 Peter Galuszka & Patricia Kranz, Look Who’s Making a Revolution: Shareholders,
BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 20, 1995 (“turning out the same basic truck for 30 years”).
18 Michail Berger & Dmitry Dokuchayev, Divided Authority at ZiL: The Giant Can
No Longer Live in the Old Way but Doesn’t Yet Want to Live in the New Way, IZVESTIA,
Apr. 16, 1996, translated in 48 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, May 15, 1996,
at 10.
19 Id. (Internal quotation omitted).  See also James Rupert, Post-Poll Jitters for
Russian Industry, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 6, 1996 (“If Mr. Yeltsin now gets serious about
ending state support for dying industries, ZiL faces desperate times.   Despite having been
privatized, the plant seems to be having trouble weaning itself from Soviet-style
subsidies.”).
20 The City increased its stake to 60% by buying the 30% stake previously owned
by Microdin, the main outside shareowners who had, for a short period brought in new
management, before the city government, labor, and the old managers intervened.  Sergey
Lukianov, Mayor Pulls Out Stops to Rescue ZiL, MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996; Elizabeth
Sullivan, Reforms Sour for Disenfranchised, Plain Dealer, June 6, 1996 (outside managers
were “forcibly escorted off the premises by the security forces of the old”).
Improvements in corporate governance will have no effect on this second group.
The third, also large group includes firms with cash reserves or assets with
significant salvage value that also benefit from subsidies or unsuitable credit
extensions.  These firms will not close until there is both an improvement in
corporate governance and an end to the subsidies and unsuitable credit extensions.
c.  The ZiL Example.  Moscow’s ailing ZiL truck company is a useful
example of a firm in the third group.  The company is a “dinosaur”17 that continues
to produce many of the same poor quality trucks as it did under the Soviets,
despite the trucks’ terrible reputation and scant market.18  As one reporter notes:
The total amount of [post-privatization] state assistance to ZiL
through various channels is estimated at approximately $100 million.
. . . [T]he plant never regarded the money it received as credits that
had to be paid back. While receiving money for the production of
trucks that customers were unwilling to pay for, ZiL continued to
ship them out. . . . [F]rom force of old Soviet habit, it kept pushing
to fulfill a plan that was long gone, at a time when it should have
been cutting production and thinking about structural
reorganization.19
As the company continued to fall apart, Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov acquired
for the city a controlling stake in the firm, but kept incumbent management in
place.20  Rather than closing the firm and liquidating its main assets, the Mayor
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21 ZiL Takes Alternative Road to Capitalism , RUSSIA EXPRESS BRIEFING, Jan. 13,
1997; Paul Funder Larsen, Buying Land is Next Hurdle for Private Firms, MOSCOW TIMES,
Nov. 26, 1996.
22 Larsen, supra  note * (“Most of Russia’s 120,000 privatized firms do not own the
land they stand on.  They do not even have a clear lease agreement.  Instead they occupy
land under a Soviet-era concept of temporary management which gives city officials a big
say in how the land is used and gives companies few rights to sublet, sell, or redevelop.”).
Cf. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (identifying anticommons in fragmented
ownership in Russian enterprise assets).  See also Sergey Lukianov, Mayor Pulls Out
Stops to Rescue ZiL, MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996 (rescue plan includes local and federal
tax breaks, direct subsidies, guaranteed purchases of ZiL output by the city, and
auctioning some ZiL real estate, “with 70 percent of the proceeds going to the company
and 30 percent to the city government”).
23 Id.
24 David Hoffman, The Man Who Rebuilt Moscow: Capitalist Style Could Propel
Mayor to National Power, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1997, at A1.
25 Moscow Truck Maker Mulls Upgrade Plans, SEGODNYA, Jan. 12, 1999, translated
in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 22, 1999.  As it was, “the plant stopped
housing construction long ago, and the plant workers, dissatisfied that they have not
received the apartments once promised to them, intend to petition the International Court
of Justice in the Hague.”  Id.
26 Berger & Dokuchayev, supra  note *.
instead began ordering city services to buy ZiL vehicles.21  He also secured a large
new line of credit on the basis of the firm’s main asset, “tens of hectares of prime
land in south Moscow with a potential market value of hundreds of millions of
dollars.”22  The Mayor’s plans were to relocate the firm’s production facilities, sell
49-year leases to some of the land raising about $35 million, and then transfer the
new funds to the company rather than to shareholders or to more viable firms.23
But as one commentator suggests, “it is not clear that even Luzhkov can create a
market for ZiL trucks.”24
Shutting down the firm at the outset would likely have been the residual
maximizing decision.  The government could have targeted its limited subsidies to
providing a social safety net for workers,25 and the land could have been sold to
its highest value users at a price that would have substantially benefitted
shareholders.  As it was, outside shareowners “realized that, despite the municipal
and federal authorities’ special treatment of this flagship of the automotive industry,
the enterprise was a hopeless failure, and [when] they tried to exert some direct
influence on the situation . . . [it] proved to be not such an easy thing.”26 
Pathology 2:  Failure to Use Existing Capacity Efficiently. — The
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Eyeing [outside investors] warily are entrenched company directors, many of
whom enjoy virtually unchecked command of the production lines they’ve
presided over for decades.  Outside investors allege these ‘Red Directors’ are
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underpricing output, and pocketing the rest.
Natasha Mileusnic, The Great Boardroom Revolution, MOSCOW TIMES, July 16, 1996.
28 One investment banker looking over Volga Paper Co. “noticed huge, dust-covered
crates packed away in the corner of the factory.  They contained $100 million worth of
brand-new Austrian-made equipment.  The Russians hadn’t bothered unpacking the stuff.”
Paul Klebnikov & Caroline Waxler, The Wild East, FORBES, Dec. 16, 1996, at 348.




second type of pathology arises when continued operation, if undertaken as
efficiently as possible and without new investment, would be a positive net present
value decision, but operation is not done as efficiently as possible.  Costs are not
minimized, the best price is not obtained for a given level of output, or a non profit-
maximizing output level is chosen – again, all common problems in Russia.27  Thus
residuals are not maximized.  Such firms should not shut down, but they should
deploy existing facilities more efficiently.28  Their residuals shortfall represents a
social-welfare-diminishing corporate governance failure.
Consider, for example, the Baltic Shipping Company, Russia’s oldest and
best known shipping enterprise.29  Under the Soviets, the firm already had wide
experience working on world markets, but they relied on inexpensive Russian fuel
to cover for management deficiencies that have persisted into the post-privatization
period:
[N]early everyone admits that the management at BSC has simply
not been up to the challenges of a new economy. . . . In his parting
words, former president Filimonov, who retains a place on the
board, pretty much admitted the management could not adapt.
“Those titles we’ve become accustomed to hearing, such as deputy
chief of finances, are simply not those functions that these people
have become used to fulfilling.”30
Though the firm could be profitable today, Baltic Shipping faces a “spiral of
decline” that could “lead to the company’s fleet disappearing completely:”31
According to the company’s foreign affairs chief, “It’s difficult to say how many
ships we have in operation, because at any moment, we could get another call
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33 If the efficiency gains are spread evenly around all classes of inputs, the effect on
the marginal product of each would be positive.  If the gains were concentrated primarily
with respect one class of inputs, for example labor, the effect on its marginal productivity
is, as a theoretical matter, ambiguous.  On the one hand, the gains increase the number of
effective units of labor represented by each actual unit.  On the other, the increase in
effective units of labor relative to other inputs decreases the marginal product of each
effective unit of labor.  If the first effect outweighs the second, then the marginal product
of labor will increase even if the more effective use of labor is the primary efficiency gain
from restructuring.  Whether this is the case depends of the elasticity of substitution of
labor for other inputs.  Empirical studies of the United States and other developed
economies suggest that the elasticity is large enough that the marginal product of labor
would increase even under these circumstances.  For a more detailed discussion of these
points, see Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should
Regulate Whom, MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2562-2569, 2630-31 (1997). 
saying another ship has been seized [by creditors].”32
The widespread existence of Pathology 2 may mask the potential extent of
Pathology 1.  If firms generally are not using their inputs efficiently, the marginal
products of these inputs are likely to be lower, and thus, in a competitive economy,
the price that needs to be paid for them and the opportunity cost of their use will
be lower as well.  A wholesale reduction in Pathology 2 will increase the price and
social opportunity cost of at least some, and quite possibly all, major classes of
inputs.33  Input price adjustments may sharply raise the number of firms displaying
Pathology 1 as the increased opportunity cost of their inputs makes their continued
operation socially undesirable.
Pathology 3:  Mis-Investment of Internally Generated Cash Flow. —
The third type of pathology arises where a firm uses its internally generated cash
flow to invest in new negative net present value projects.  Instead of making bad
investments, such a firm should instead pay out this cash flow to shareholders.
Shareholders could invest these funds better elsewhere in the economy.  An
example of Pathology 3 includes the seemingly responsible act of using funds
labeled by accountants as depreciation to replace worn out plant and equipment,
if doing so is a negative net present value project.  Pathology 3 can arise in
conjunction with, or independent of, Pathology 2.  Significant indirect evidence
from two sources suggests that Pathology 3 is widespread in Russia.
First, consider the paucity of interfirm cash flows in Russia.  In any
economy, good investment opportunities are unlikely to be spread so evenly
among existing enterprises that interfirm transfers of cash flows through the capital
markets are not called for.  Nor is the quality of existing firms’ opportunities likely
to be consistently superior to the opportunities that could be found by new firms.
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34 The lack of interfirm transfers undoubtedly is also in part due to various
techniques that managers use to make non-pro-rata distributions that result in cash flow
diversions to accounts that they control overseas.  Because of these diversions, the firms
involved have less cash, if any,  available to pay dividends.  To the extent that a foreign
destination was chosen for these diversions because of a desire to protect what at home
would have been considered stolen money or because it assists an attempt at tax evasion,
the expected returns of the foreign investment funds by these diversions are likely to be
lower than those of some of the unfunded projects of Russian firms.  This is an example of
the complex mixture of corporate governance failures in which the method by which a non-
pro rata distribution is undertaken leads to a failure to maximize residuals as well, a point
discussed in more detail in I.D infra.
Thus, some existing firms (capital surplus firms) will have cash flows greater than
what is needed to fund all their positive net present value projects; other existing
firms (capital deficit firms) have insufficient cash flows to fund all such projects.
In addition, there will exist new firms with positive net present value projects but
which, by definition, have no cash flows at all.  Thus, interfirm cash flow transfers
are called for from surplus firms to deficit firms and new firms.  In a market
economy with clearly distinct firms, these transfers are accomplished when surplus
firms pay dividends and deficit firms and new firms enter the capital markets, for
example through the offering of new equity.  In Russia, firms pay little or nothing
in the way of dividends and equity finance is negligible.  The lack of interfirm
transfers strongly suggests that the surplus firms are instead displaying Pathology
3 and likely investing in negative net present value projects.34
The second source of indirect evidence for Pathology 3 relates to firms’
failure to make pro-rata distributions of residuals.  One way that controlling
shareholders can divert a disproportionate share of residuals to themselves is to
have the firm invest in projects personally benefitting these shareholders.  On
balance, controlling shareholders may prefer to fund such projects, even if they
have a negative net present value – their personal benefits more than outweigh the
reduction in share value from implementing the project.  Controlling shareholders
will be able to indulge these preferences if the mechanisms to constrain non pro-
rata distribution of dividends are weak.  The abundant evidence of non pro-rata
distributions in Russia strongly suggests that Pathology 3 is likely to be prevalent.
Pathology 4:  Failure to Implement Positive Net Present Value
Projects. – The fourth pathology of non residual maximization arises directly or
indirectly when a firm identifies, but then fails to act on, positive net present value
projects.  If others do not pick up the opportunity, the firm’s failure reduces social
welfare as well because of the forgone chance to deploy funds to produce a return
greater than their opportunity cost.
Pathology 4 is a direct result of corporate governance failures in cases
[October 25, 1999 draft]                  LESSONS FROM FIASCOS 15
35 According to Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse, the average age of enterprise directors
is still over 50 years. J. BLASI, M. KROUMOVA & D. KRUSE, KREMLIN CAPITALISM (1997).  The
OECD notes, “These directors were trained under the Soviet system.  Although
management skills were often important for promotion (as were political ties) during Soviet
power, entrepreneurial ingenuity for successful restructuring or reorganization involving
risk was usually not rewarded.”  OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1997-
1998, at 158 n.171.
36 It is hard to get a sense of the extent of this problem for established (as opposed
to new) Russian firms.  Many firms face one of three choices: continued operation in its
current form, massive investment to build an entirely new factory, or dissolution.  Often,
it seems clear that continued operation in the firm’s current form would be a highly
inefficient choice because there is no market for the product at prices sufficient to pay for
the inputs  and any opportunity costs associated with its fixed assets.  And funds for a
massive investment in a new factory are often not available. As a result,
The conflict between production-oriented Soviet-era management and aggressive
new owners has been played out at hundreds of factories across the country.
The fledgling entrepreneurs have lacked the massive capital required to make the
aging red giants profitable and their attempts to make money by shutting them
down and selling off their assets have proven politically explosive.  As a result,
privatisation has often failed to lead to restructuring.
ZiL Takes Alternative Road to Capitalism, RUSSIA EXPRESS BRIEFING, Jan. 13, 1997.  It is
not clear whether the lack of funds is solely due to capital market defects that arise from
economy-wide corporate governance problems or whether, even without these problems,
the new factory would be an insufficiently promising investment project to get funded.  In
(continued...)
where managers, due to weak control mechanisms, reject a positive net present
value project because they wish to avoid personal risk.  Managers tend to be risk
averse because they cannot diversify away the unsystematic risk associated with
any individual firm project.  If managers can get away with it, they may reject
projects with high expected returns if the projects have high unsystematic risk as
well, even though such rejections are not in the interests of shareholders or society
as a whole.  By contrast, portfolio shareholders, who can diversify their holdings,
are risk neutral with respect to unsystematic project-level risk.  Management risk
aversion causes problems everywhere, but the problems are likely accentuated in
established Russian firms because incumbent managers typically internalized a high
degree of risk aversion through Soviet-era careers in which punishment for major
mistakes far exceeded gains from major successes.35
Corporate governance failures can also lead firms indirectly to forgo
positive net present value projects.  Consider a firm with willing managers and the
prospect of a value-creating project that is nevertheless unable to proceed
because financing is unavailable at a price equal to capital’s social opportunity
cost.36  The lack of finance may be an externality imposed by corporate
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general, entrepreneurs seem likely to claim the former reason.
37 Non-pro-rata distributions that result in cash flow diversions to accounts that
they control overseas may also result in firms without sufficient internal resources having
to forgo projects that have a positive net present value when discounted at a rate reflecting
capital’s true social opportunity cost.  See note [ a coupe above relating to diversions]
supra .
38 Doing Business in Russia: Risk and Reward in Equal Measure, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1998, at 17.
39 Swedish-Owned Paper Mill in Karelia Paralyzed by Fuel Shortage, RUSSIAN TV
CHANNEL BROADCAST, translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 3, 1997.
40 Doing Business in Russia, supra  note *, at 17.
41 Greg McIvor, Assi Hurt by Russian Plant Write-Off, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 13,
1998, at 29.
governance failures in other firms.  When firms generally fail to make pro-rata
distributions and maximize residuals, they may severely undermine the possibility
that firms with good projects can acquire financing through sales of new equity.
Banks are the usual alternative source for outside finance, but in Russia, banks are
providing little long-term corporate lending.  The lack of a vibrant new equity
market or of bank finance then proves fatal for good projects in those firms which
do not generate sufficient internal funds to self-finance the project.37
In Russia, the corporate governance failures in established firms can be
spectacularly large.  Consider, for example the saga at Segezhabumprom, one of
Russia’s biggest pulp and paper mills.38  Swedish owners acquired a 57% stake
in the firm; while a major pulp distributor and the Karelian regional government
controlled most of the rest of the shares.  Early in the relationship, when the town
of Segezha had run out of fuel oil, the Swedes had agreed to “burn expensive
wood chips, normally used in paper production, to prevent the town from
freezing.”39  Later, the Swedes identified and committed to make over $100 million
in new investments.  However, the modernization plans provoked local suspicion
of job losses, prompting a campaign to force the Swedes out, an effort which
included court findings that the Swedes’ initial share purchases had been illegal.40
A break point occurred when the Russian co-owners – the regional government
and the major distributor – refused to co-fund the working capital to keep the
plant open.41  By the end, the Swedes abandoned the investment and wrote off
their ownership stake, after existing managers and local government officials drove
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42 Doing Business in Russia, supra  note *, at 17.  See also the story of Sidanko, infra
note [46] and accompanying text.
43 Mark Whitehouse, The Other Side of the Room, MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997.
44 See Ronald Gilson & Joseph Bankman, Why Spinoffs , STAN L.  REV. (1998).
45 Id.
46 A record of successful spinoffs demonstrates a failure in the finance processes
of established firms and hence shows some mix of Pathologies 4 and 5.  One study of the
semiconductor industry shows the reason that proponents of successful spinoffs took
their ideas elsewhere is that top management of employer firms simply did not perceive the
ideas to be worth substantial investment.  MERRITT FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL
PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY (1987).
them off using “mafia-style threats against [their] staff.”42  A story of this sort is
likely to scare off even a determined large scale investor, which in most countries
could protect itself using the control powers that come with large shareownership.
This story is even more discouraging for individual non-control portfolio investors.
As discussed further in Part II, stories like Segezhabumprom also suggest that
Russian corporate law may be so weak that the results of the ordinary processes
of corporate decisionmaking are not respected by officials charged with enforcing
property rights.  Incumbent managers appear still to have de facto property rights
in assets whose title is nominally in the hands of the corporation.
 Pathology 5:  Failure to Identify Positive Net Present Value Projects.
– The fifth type of pathology arises when a firm’s managers fail even to identify
positive net present value projects that the firm, through its specialization and the
resulting accumulation of knowledge, is particularly well positioned to find.43
Organizational capacity to identify such opportunities is related to the incentives
available to firm employees for identifying such projects as well as the incentives
for them to help each other in a joint endeavor to do so.44
In the United States, venture capital significantly reduces the social costs
of Pathology 5 by making available funds for promising projects that employees
identify, but managers mis-assess.  Venture capital also significantly lessens the
effects of Pathology 4 on the U.S. economy by making spinoffs possible in which
employees proposing such projects can implement the proposal by creating a new
firm, despite the employer’s rejection.  The possibility of getting rich in a spinoff
gives employees substantial incentives to identify positive net present value
projects even if they work for firms that may ultimately not implement the ideas.45
Also, when spinoffs occur, Pathologies 4 and 5 do not harm the economy because
the project is implemented anyway.46
In Russia, venture capital to fund such projects is not readily available.  So,
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47 Easterbrook and Fischel argue that this statement of basic norms in corporate law
needs refinement.  Unequal divisions of gains from corporate activity will be tolerated, they
suggest, provided that the transaction makes no shareholder worse off.  FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 143-44
(1991).  Their refinement is valid to an extent, but whether the refinement should be stated
so broadly is irrelevant to our discussion of the Russian situation.  Few of the many blatant
violations of the principle against non pro-rata distributions that we see in Russia could
possibly be justified as necessary to permit transactions that leave no shareholder worse
off.   
48 “One notorious incident involved Krasnoyarsk Aluminum, which deleted from its
share register – the only legal proof of ownership – a 20 percent stake held by the British
Trans World Group, effectively wiping out its holding.”  Natasha Mileusnic, The Great
Boardroom Revolution, MOSCOW TIMES, July 16, 1996; David Fairlamb, Moscow Madness,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR , July 1995, at 30 (“Some companies think nothing of striking
shareholders’ names off registers if they look like they’re becoming a nuisance.”).
Pathology 5 is likely to be more prevalent than in the U.S. and Pathology 4 is likely
to be more damaging.  Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black have persuasively argued
that a necessary condition for developing venture capital is a vibrant equity market.
But Russia will not be able to develop equity markets until most of its firms try to
maximize residuals and give pro-rata distributions.  Again, we see the self-
reinforcing tendency of diverse corporate governance problems.
C.  The Failure to Make Pro-Rata Distributions
The second feature of good corporate governance is that a firm makes the
residuals it generates available on a pro-rata basis to the residual claimants, that
is, to the common shareholders in an investor-owned company.  Much of modern
corporate law has been built around this principle, not only rules requiring that
dividends and distributions be made pro-rata but also the basic fiduciary rules
policing non-arms-length transactions involving insiders and the corporation.47  In
post-privatization Russia, violation of this second feature has been the most visible
and widely reported symptom of bad corporate governance.  Just as non-
maximization comes in different flavors, Russian firms exhibit a wide range of non
pro-rata distributions which we simplify into two main groups, each with many
variations.  Loosely, one type is what we call “diversion of claims” and the other
“diversion of assets.”  We explore each in turn.
Pathology 6:  Diversion of claims. – To give just a few illustrations
ranging from blatant to subtle, managers divert control when they refuse to register
share purchases by outsiders;48 refuse to recognize board directors properly
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49 One long-running case involves the Novolipetsk Metal Factory, one of Russia’s
largest metal produces, where western investment funds were unable over the course of
several years to place anybody on the board of directors, despite controlling over 40
percent of the firm’s shares and despite cumulative voting rules that should have
guaranteed them some voice.  Mark Whitehouse, Novolipetsk  Slams Foreign Investors,
MOSCOW TIMES, Mar. 15, 1997.  According to the Chairman of Novolipetsk, “In Russia’s
special situation, the master is, after all, not the shareholder.”  Id.  See also  Natasha
Mileusnic, The Great Boardroom Revolution, MOSCOW TIMES, July 16, 1996; John
Thornhill, Risks of Russian Market Exposed, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON); Mar. 25, 1997, at
2.  Finally, in 1998, the outside investors were able to win seats on the board after the
general director switched sides in this “marquee shareholders’ rights case.”  Shareholders
Win Two-Year Case, Can Appoint Board Members to Firm, 11 INT’L SEC. REG. REP., Jan
29, 1998.
50 Geoff Winestock, Ship Firm Managers, Shareholders Face Off in Russia, J.
COMMERCE, Apr. 24, 1995, at 1A:
Managers have seen their position change dramatically over the last year with the
public sale of their stock to outside investors.  Shareholders, for one, have started
to ask for higher profits and a voice in the company.  Investors charge that
management decided on a simple solution to the problem.  They unilaterally
issued themselves enough shares to take back control of their companies.
Id .;  see also Gary Peach, Financial Ethics Crackdown Bodes Well for Shareholders,
MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998 (“Dalmoreprodukt, Russia’s largest seafood exporter, is in
the process of watering down outsiders’ interests by means of an insider share issuance
for select major shareholders, managers, and employees.”).
51 See, e.g.,Kranz, supra  note *, at 44 (“In regions across Russia, both local
governments and creditors have filed bankruptcy suits against subsidiaries of Potanin’s
Sidanko Oil.  The suits ostensibly seek payment of back taxes and delinquent energy bills.
But the real prize could be Sidanko’s oil assets.”); Andrew Higgins, The Lion’s Share: As
One Bank Shows, Bankruptcy in Russia is a Real Cat Fight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1999, at
A1 (“Just as Russia’s earlier drive to put state property in private hands often yielded cozy
inside deals instead of a spur to efficiency, bankruptcy has mutated into a cat fight often
involving shadowy deals and allegations of asset stripping.  ‘Many enterprises are being
artificially bankrupted, to be taken over by some groups,’ Prime Minister Yevgeny
Primakov [said.]”).
elected by minority shareowners;49 dilute stock in ways that freezes out
outsiders;50 or engage in fake bankruptcies that wipe out shareowner’s interests.51
The key feature of these non pro-rata distributions are that the people perpetrating
them, usually insider owner-managers, are keeping the firm intact, including its
assets and opportunities.  They gain instead by manipulating the corporate legal
system, the bankruptcy law, and other laws to reduce or eliminate the claims of
some or all of its shareholders on the firm’s residuals – usually wiping out the
outside minority shareholders.  As one investor put it, “A 51 percent shareholding
interest in a Russian company conveys to the owner a license to steal from the
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52 Investor Hell, J. COMMERCE, June 15, 1998, at 6A.
53 Lyudmila Leontyeva, Red Director’s Stronghold in Kuban, MOSCOW NEWS, Oct.
30, 1997.
54 Mark Whitehouse, Germans Cry Foul In Gypsum Plant Feud, MOSCOW TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1997; Mark Whitehouse, Under Seige, MOSCOW TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997.
55 Katy Daigle, Nemstov Hails Win for Investors’ Rights, MOSCOW TIMES, Mar. 10,
1998.
56 Mark Whitehouse, Take ‘Em to Court, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 10, 1998(quoting
Knauf lawyer).
remaining 49 percent.”52
In one notorious case that has dragged on for years, the incumbent
manager at Kuban Gypsum-Knauf refused to vacate even though he had been
fired by the majority owners, a German company.53  Supported by the local
government, the manager installed Cossack guards, held his own shareholder
meetings, locked out the owners, diluted the owners’ stock, and ignored dozens
of court rulings against him over the years.54  Finally, and for the first time in
Russia, the German owners were able to wrestle their way back in, following
intervention by a commission headed by the Prime Minister.55  According to one
Knauf lawyer, “It’s a sort of legal nihilism.  The farther from Moscow, the less
attention they pay to the legal side of things.  There is no understanding of a final
court order.”56
And managers are not the only ones diverting control.  Recent reports
suggest that local and regional governments with minority share interests have
begun engaging in the same game, forcing firms into bankruptcy over unpaid taxes,
and then asserting control, essentially a form of renationalization in cases where tax
rates are absurdly high, exceeding 100% marginal rates.  Also, outside
shareholders such as those associated with financial-industrial groups (FIGs) may
seize control of firms, replace managers, and then also freeze out minority share
holders, including employees.  
Many of these tactics are familiar to students of the history of western
corporate law, but in Russia this game seems limited only by the creativity of those
controlling the firm: the Russian regulatory apparatus has been notoriously
ineffective in controlling such diversions.  To give one example, in late 1997,
insider shareholders had Sidanko Oil company offered exclusively to themselves
for nominal consideration a form of bonds that were convertible into Sidanko
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1998; Jeanne Whalen, FSC Cracks Down on Yukos, Sidanko, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 19,
1998 (FSC action perhaps marks a “turning point”).  In the interests of full disclosure, the
authors of this  article should state that they served as consultants to some minority share
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58 Katy Daigle, Bill Improves Shareholder Rights in Russia, MOSCOW TIMES, July
14, 1998 (“In Russia, company directors and managers are routinely accused of insider
dealing, which includes everything from accepting bribes to act against their company’s
interests to selling assets or shares to relatives or friends.”).
59 See, e.g. Jeanne Whalen, Shareholder Rights: Round 2 , Moscow Times, Feb. 17,
1998 (discussing transfer pricing at Tomskneft, one minority shareholder protested, “Tax
debts  and the cost of production are left with the subsidiaries, while profits are illegally
upstreamed to the parent.”); Jeanne Whalen, Navigating the Russian Subsidiaries
Minefield, MOSCOW TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998 (“Share swaps aside, transfer pricing is the
practice most feared by subsidiary shareholders.  Holding companies force subsidiaries to
sell their oil at below-market prices, and then resell it for a profit that is kept by the holding
(continued...)
shares.57  Once the conversion occurred, the remaining shareholders would see
their ownership stake diluted down to one third of their original claim, yet the
company gained no significant new assets.  The only unusual aspect of this share
dilution was that for the first time in its history, the Russian Securities and Exchange
Commission, in the glare of particularly intense negative press about the scheme,
intervened in early 1998 to block the issuance of the convertible bonds.  As a
result, the majority insiders agreed to negotiate with minority share holders.  Such
regulatory oversight has been extremely rare, not a regular event in the Russian
scene.  But, even this victory was Pyrrhic.  Since then, the owners of Sidanko Oil
have apparently forced it into a fake bankruptcy, effectively freezing out another
major shareholder, British Petroleum, which had invested $500 million in the firm
for a 10 percent ownership stake, a stake now apparently worthless despite the
quite valuable assets that the reorganized firm will control.
Pathology 7:  Diversion of assets. – The second major class of non pro-
rata distributions, and the last pathology in our framework, involves direct
diversion of assets and opportunities belonging to the firm.  The key feature of this
type of corporate governance failure is that insiders leave the ownership structure
intact as they hollow out the firm.  For managers, diversion of assets may be
accomplished by outright looting of the firm – taking cash or assets belonging to
the firm and effectively giving title to the insiders.  Or it may take the form of
sweetheart business deals with firms controlled by insiders or their families,58 using,
for example, transfer pricing agreements that move profits to subsidiaries or
parents in which the insiders have a larger interest.59  According to one report,
[October 25, 1999 draft]                  LESSONS FROM FIASCOS 22
59(...continued)
company.”).
60 Patricia Kranz, Shareholders at the Gate, BUSINESS WEEK, June 2, 1995, at 60.
61 Gary Peach, POOR MANAGEMENT DESTROYS SBERBANK, TATNEFT, MGTS, MOSCOW
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998.
“Protecting sweetheart financial deals is behind much of the hostility to outside
investors.  Virtually every Russian enterprise, big or small, is surrounded by
‘independent’ companies set up by managers or their families.  In many cases,
sales and purchasing contracts are structured to go through these firms, raking off
profits from the main enterprise.”60  
Russian firms also engage in non pro-rata distribution of residuals when
they continue to pay for redundant shareholder employees and when the firm
provides public services without compensation or relief from reasonably and
equitably imposed tax obligations.  The experience of Tatneft shows a simple but
creative form of non pro-rata distribution in favor of a local government
shareholder.  According to one report, 
Tatneft is the victim of parasitism, pure and simple. . . .  [Regional
government] bureaucrats who control the firm were under orders
to borrow as much money as possible on international capital
markets to support the region’s economy and the government’s pet
programs. . . . The company piled on almost $800 million in debt
in 1997 alone, and now has over $1 billion of the stuff on its
balance sheet.  Tatneft was forced to make sizeable loans to the
regional government (now broke).61
Neither the diversion of assets, nor diversion of claims noted in the previous
section, necessarily decreases social welfare in a static analysis – the diversions
merely redistribute wealth from one group of owners to another.  But moving to
a dynamic analysis changes the story.  If outsiders cannot trust that they will get
pro-rata distributions, then they will be unwilling generally to treat shares as
financial assets, and they will be unwilling to provide equity finance in exchange for
anything less than total control.  So the prevalence of diversion imposes a
substantial externality on the Russian enterprise sector.  Because potential outside
investors cannot protect against ex post diversions of their investments in firms that
turn out to be successful, outsiders have little ex ante incentive to invest on terms
that would be appealing to firms with positive net present value projects.  
D.  A Simple Framework Meets Complex Failures
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62 Consider the recent looting of the Moscow City Telephone company (MGTS).
Even though it is  the largest telecommunications company in Russia, its share price has
dropped 95% from its high.  According to one report, majority ownership was transferred
from a public body to a “secretive outfit that has links both political and economic to
Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov.  Any growth potential for the stock has thus been
eliminated. . . . [I]t is safe to say that [the new owners] have no concern for shareholders
of MGTS.  What [they] care about, though, is getting Luzhkov elected to the presidency,
so MGTS’ available cash will be utilized accordingly.”  Gary Peach, POOR MANAGEMENT
DESTROYS SBERBANK, TATNEFT, MGTS, MOSCOW TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998.  See also  Gary
Peach, Mayor’s Industrial Policy Carries Big Costs, MOSCOW TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998 (noting
that diverting control of “prize municipal assets” ensures that these firms “bountiful cash
flow” will be available to help Luzhkov “meet the presidential challenge in 2000”).  
For another complex diversion example, see Alan S. Cullison, Russian Share Shuffle
Maddens Investors, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1999, at A12 (discussing Yukos Oil company’s
quiet transfer of the bulk of its two most valuable petroleum-producing assets to offshore
entities).  See also  Alan S. Cullison, Yukos Transfers Two Oil Units to Offshore Firms,
WALL ST. J., June 4, 1999, at A12 (noting earlier part of saga where the tycoon who controls
Yukos had “barred minority investors from shareholder meetings at three Yukos
subsidiaries and pushed through permission for massive share issues that will dilute
investors’ holdings”).
63 The perquisites are unlikely to give the insiders as much utility as the cash that
they cost would.  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firim:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
The sweetheart deals are unlikely to be with the least cost provider of the service or good
needed.  
Table 1 below summarizes our framework of Russia’s corporate
governance pathologies.  Real world cases do not fit neatly into one or another of
the boxes we describe here, but rather represent complex mixtures of several
failures.  To start, if managers that are not sufficiently constrained or incentivized
to prevent them from diverting claims, they may be similarly able to divert assets
– both types of diversion may be undertaken at once, often in ways that are hard
to tease apart.62  Next, there is a potential interaction between the failure to make
pro-rata distributions and the failure to maximize residuals.  Some tactics used to
effect a non pro-rata distribution of a firm’s wealth have no direct effect on
residual maximization.  This would generally be true of diversion of claims and of
brazen, outright theft of assets.  Other tactics however, do reduce a firm’s
residuals, for example when owner-managers grant themselves unjustifiably large
perquisites, make non-arms-length sweetheart deals involving the company and its
insiders,63 and engage in direct thefts of assets that require considerable efforts to
cover up.   
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TABLE 1: Framework of Russian Corporate Governance Pathologies
I.  Non -Maximization of Residuals




Arises when an unreformable value-destroying firm can
dissipate cash reserves or salvageable assets.  Corporate
governance is not the key issue when firm has no reserves
or salvageable assets, or when subsidies or unsuitable
credits are present.
Pathology 2:  
Viable firms fail to
use existing capacity
efficiently
Arises when continued firm operation, if undertaken as
efficiently as possible and without new investment, would
be a positive net present value (NPV) decision; but costs
are not minimized, the best price is not obtained for given
output, or a non profit-maximizing output level is chosen




Arises when a firm uses internally generated cash flow to
invest in new negative NPV projects instead of paying out
this cash flow to shareholders who could invest the funds
better elsewhere in the economy.




Arises when a firm identifies but then fails to act on
positive NPV projects.  Managers tend to be risk averse
because they can’t diversify away unsystematic risk of a
firm’s project.  If others do not pick up the opportunity, the
firm’s failure also reduces social welfare.
Pathology 5:  
Firms fail to 
identify positive NPV
projects
Arises when a firm’s managers fail to identify positive NPV
projects that the firm is particularly well positioned to find. 
The possibility of venture financing and spinoffs can
reduce the prevalence and social costs of this pathology.
II.  Non Pro-Rata Distributions
Pathology 6:
Firms fail to prevent
diversion of claims
Arises when some residual owners of a firm manipulate
corporate, bankruptcy, and other laws to shift ownership
away from other residual owners – often by diluting shares
held by outside minority shareholders.
Pathology 7 :
Firms fail to prevent
diversion of assets
Arises when some residual owners privately appropriate
assets and opportunities belonging to the firm, but leave
the firm’s formal ownership structure intact.
Finally a management intently focused on, and especially skilled in,
diversions may have neither the time nor the ability to give adequate attention to
maximize residuals as well. Consider AutoVAZ, Russia’s largest automaker.  The
company evidences several of the pathologies of non residual maximization:  they
continue to employ 114,000 workers and essentially comprise the town of
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64 Alexander M. Jenkyn, Russian Auto Manufacturers, Hobbled by Inefficient
Management, Look to Foreign Investors, EAST/WEST EXECUTIVE GUIDE, May 1, 1997.
65 Mark Whitehouse, Slow Death, MOSCOW TIMES, June 16, 1998 (a lengthy account
of AutoVAZ’s management difficulties and slow decline).
66 Id. (quoting Victor Frumkin, an automobile analyst).
67 Russia’s Nemtsov Threatens Asset Seizures, Bankruptcies over Huge Tax Arrears,
AFX NEWS, Sept. 23, 1997.
68 Autovaz to Issue New Shares, RUSSIAN BUSINESS NEWS UPDATE, Sept. 1, 1997.
69 Auto Giant Labors Under Tax Burden, ITAR-TASS, translated in BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 5, 1998 (quoting Autovaz’s Chairman of the Board).
70 Kirill Koriukin, Debt-Laden AutoVAZ Hands State 50% Stake, MOSCOW TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1998.
Togliatti; production takes 450 worker-hours per car, compared with 15 worker-
hours for Toyota; seven of ten current production models were designed in the
1970s; the firm lacks working capital; and the size of the plant makes changeover
to new production extremely expensive.64  Poor management undermines the
company in many ways: working capital disappears, “insider deals and criminal
groups sap would-be profits, and attempts at reform have been half-baked at
best.”65  According to one analyst, “The company is going to die a death by a
thousand cuts.  It’s just going to sit there until someone sees the potential value in
some of its assets, strips them out and creates a different franchise or does a
complete management overhaul.66  With its mix of management failures, the
company became the country’s largest tax laggard.67  To get an extension on tax
arrears, the firm guaranteed that it would dilute its stock enough to give 51% of
voting shares to the government if the firm missed two tax payments.68  But then
the firm proved unable to finish cars because, “almost the entire amount of income
[was] used to pay taxes.”69  After missing several tax payments, Autovaz agreed
to what amounts to renationalization.70
II.  THE ROLE OF INITIAL CONDITIONS IN RUSSIAN PRIVATIZATION
The preceding discussion establishes the severity of corporate governance
problems in Russia and the mechanisms by which these problems inflict damage
on the real economy.  Standard explanations of these corporate governance
failures include the low level of corporate transparency, the lack of effective
methods for adjudicating claimed violations of corporate law and enforcing the
resulting judgments, and the absence of a network trust among Russian
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71 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 62, 633-59 (1998) (showing how poorly
conceived real estate privatization can lead to a “tragedy of the anticommons”).
businessmen.  While these explanations are important, they are common to all
transition economies to one extent or another.  We believe that to understand why
Russian corporate governance problems have been so severe, it is necessary to
consider the initial conditions of Russian privatization, in particular, the often
untenable boundaries of newly, privatized firms and the insider-dominated
ownership and control structures.
These initial conditions are unique to Russia (and the other republics of the
former Soviet Union).  They result from a privatization program that followed the
course of least resistance.  The domestic Russian architects of privatization and
their foreign advisers believed it politically necessary to move quickly.  As with real
estate privatization,71 the initial path in corporate privatization represents not only
political expediency, but also the primacy of pure economists over those more
sensitive to the bargaining implications of packaging rights.  The reformers hoped,
naively as it turned out, that resources would naturally flow to their highest value
users after markets were established.  But they underestimated the roadblocks that
the initial conditions would continue to impose for resource reallocation.  In this
Part, we detail these initial conditions and then explore how they have contributed
to Russian corporate governance failures and the resulting dismal economic
performance.
A.  Initial Conditions in Russia
1.  Untenable Firm Boundaries. – The first unique feature of Russian
privatization is the bizarrely tangled and complex pattern of firm boundaries.  To
crystalize the problem, we compare the way firm boundaries are defined in
developed competitive economies with how they were determined during
privatization in Russia.
a.  Firm Boundaries in Developed Competitive Economies. –
Transaction cost economics provides an easy way to understand the nature of firm
boundaries in a developed competitive economy.  As transaction cost economists
envision the world, a country’s economic activities consists of a set of transactions
– potentially value enhancing reallocations of goods and services – that occur
between two or more parties.  Every transaction that is not simultaneous and
unambiguous in its implications for each party requires some kind of mechanism
to govern the actions of the parties over time.  In the simplest model, there are only
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72 This  is the simple model that underlies Coase’s seminal 1937 article.  Ronald C.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4  ECONOMICA 386. Modern work in transaction cost
economics identifies a wide range of governance mechanisms in between the two extremes
described in the simple model,  see sources cite in notes [just below ] infra, but the simple
model is sufficient to illustrate the important points in the discussion here. 
73 Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1200 (1984).
74 For representative work, see OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM (1985); Benjamin Klein, et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW  &  ECON. 297 (1978).   Oliver Hart’s
“property rights” approach further explains the forces that define firm boundaries in a
competitive economy.  Hart builds on the transaction cost approach by exploring in more
detail exactly what changes when the same transaction occurs within a firm instead of
between firms.  See OLIVER HART , FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, 13-91
(1995). 
two possible mechanisms, either an easily enforceable contract that specifies for
each possible future state of nature what each party must do (referred to as a “well
specified contract”), or a firm.  With a firm, one party owns all the assets related
to making the transaction value-enhancing.  The owner enters an agreement with
another party in which the owner promises compensation and the other party
promises in return to do whatever, within a specified range of activities, the firm
owner commands it to do.72  In this simple model, every transaction in the
economy occurs in one of two places:  either within a firm – i.e. it occurs under this
command arrangement – or between a firm (or other individual) and another firm
(or individual) pursuant to a well specified contract.  A firm’s boundary is defined,
on the one hand, by the transactions that occur within it and, on the other, by the
transactions  that occur between it and others.
The least cost approach to governing some transactions is by command
within a firm; for other transactions, by well specified contracts with outsiders.
The central tenet of transaction cost economics is that in a competitive economy,
market forces push transactions toward the mechanism that minimizes governance
costs, referred to as “transaction costs,” a process that in turn determines firm
boundaries.73  The work of transaction cost economists, suggests plausible, and
in some instances empirically verifiable, reasons why in developed competitive
economies we see the existing pattern of firm boundaries.74
b.  Firm Boundaries in Russia. – In Russia, the privatization process
created an initial set of firms that divided up national economic activity in ways
largely unrelated to the concerns of transaction cost minimization.  Each privatized
firm had a management team, workers, assets, and product mix that roughly
corresponded to an administrative unit in the old Soviet economy.  Often this unit
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75 Putting issues of market power aside, there is in any given industry an optimal firm
size that involves a tradeoff between scale economies (to the extent they exist) and the
managerial incentive problems that tend to grow with firm size.  See HART , supra  note *,
at 51. 
76 See Stephanie Baker-Said, Steel Mill Begins Crawl to Productivity, MOSCOW
TIMES, June 2, 1997; Neela Banerjee, Russian Firm Controls Elections, Profits By Buying
City’s Media, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 15, 1997, at 16A (“almost everyone works for
the steelmaker or has a relative who does”).
77  Id.
78 Patrick Ninneman, Growth in China and India; Turmoil in Russia; Discussions
During the 1997 Steel Survival Strategies Conference, 13 NEW STEEL 76 (Aug. 1997). 
79 According to one firm analyst, “Severstal does not have a track record of either
cheating investors or treating them fairly.  They are not interested in the capital markets,
but at the same time they don’t  engage in share issues or transfer pricing to the extent that
other companies do.”  Brian Humphreys, State to Sell 10% Stake in Northern Steel Plant,
(continued...)
was largely geographically based, so that a firm might encompass all the economic
activity occurring within a given town or district, including perhaps a major
enterprise such as auto manufacture, activities constituting any locally produced
inputs for that enterprise, and other activities that simply met the consumption
needs of local residents, such as a dairy or bakery.  The firm was also often highly
integrated horizontally, being the only such firm in the country, or one of only a
few, that produced its main product, even though in many cases scale economies
did not require such a high level of concentration.75  The boundaries of such a firm
may (or may not) have made sense within a centrally planned and managed
economy, but they in no way correspond to the boundaries that would minimize
transaction costs in a competitive market economy.
Severstal, one of Russia’s largest steel companies, illustrates the plight of
large employers in one-factory towns.  The company’s 48,000 employees make
up the dominant wage base of Cherepovets, a city of 300,000; and the firm alone
contributes more than one-third of the regional government’s budget.76  Even
though the company is headed by an “energetic 31-year-old general director, who
was elected by shareholders,”77 the firm faces numerous difficulties raising capital,
shedding labor, and spinning off apartments and other social services.  The
director notes, “The economy of Cherepovets largely depends on Severstal.
Employment is an important issue, especially in this time of political uncertainty.”78
A firm such as Severstal, with poor firm boundaries, massive over-
employment, and increasingly obsolete equipment, cannot drum up much outside
investor interest even with a relatively benign corporate governance reputation.79
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MOSCOW TIMES, May 12, 1998 (quoting Kakha Kiknavelidze, a metals analyst).
80 Id.
81 Brian Humphreys, State to Sell 10% Stake in Northern Steel Plant, MOSCOW
TIMES, May 12, 1998.
82 Id.
83 The insiders may secure absolute control, not just of the firm, but also of the
surrounding governments.  The firm’s odd boundaries make it particularly vulnerable to
political depredations by local and regional governments.  Rather than restructure, the firm
has defended itself by buying all of the newspapers, radio and television stations in the
region, even though they are for the most part unprofitable.  Neela Banerjee, Russian Firm
Controls Elections, Profits By Buying City’s Media , DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 15,
1997, at 16A.  These captive media then backed company-sponsored candidates who
captured all the city’s elected positions and then “voted to cut Severstal’s property taxes
retroactively for all of 1996, despite budget shortfalls.  The decision saved the company
several million dollars in taxes.”  Id.
84 As Blasi recounts:
The Russian general director is similar in authority to the chief executive officer
(CEO) of a capitalist company. . . .  In the past, a Soviet ministry could hire and fire
him.   Once Gorbachev removed cabinet supervision from the top managers of [the
general director’s] plant, the only formal authority over his enterprise was a
(continued...)
“Outside bidders for the stake would be taking a risk by buying into a company
with a closed management style.”80  Recently, the regional office of the State
Property Committee decided to sell its 10 percent share in the company, but the
only likely bidders are the insider management whose current share is a “well-
guarded secret.”81  Most likely, acquiring the 10 percent would boost management
from its current majority control position to over 75 percent at which point it would
have “absolute control,”82 of the company, free of many protections for minority
shareholders.83  Thus, we get a preview of how poor firm boundaries can lead to
potential corporate governance problems and inflict more economic damage than
simply the increased transaction costs they cause.
2.  Dominance by Insider Groups. – a. Insider Control Before
Privatization. Russia has a long history of control by a combination of
management, labor representatives and local government insiders.  During the
Soviet era, central planning and ministry supervision disciplined insiders’ decision-
making, to some extent.  Beginning with Gorbachev’s reforms in the late-1980s
and Yeltsin’s reforms in the early 1990s, central ministry control was loosened
without installing any outside monitor as a replacement.  Managers quickly came
to idea that enterprises needed an owner, and that they indeed were that owner.84
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distant state bureaucracy that was spinning out of control, and the now
independent, authoritarian [general director] could do what he pleased. [The
general director] was probably tempted to treat the company as his personal
property.  This process has been called spontaneous privatization.
BLASI, supra  note *, at 33.
85 BLASI, supra  note *, at 40.
86 BLASI, supra  note *, at 40.
87 WDR, supra  note *, at 55; BLASI, supra  note *, at 192 (Table 3) (discussing slight
discrepancies in number of firms privatized and citing sources).
88 Roman Frydman, Katharina Pistor & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Investing in Insider-
Dominated Firms: A Study of Russian Voucher Privatization Funds, in 1 CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA 189 (Roman Frydman, Cheryl Gray & Andrzej
Rapaczynski, eds., 1996).
89 In 1988, medium (more than 200 employees) and large enterprises (more than 1000)
accounted for about 95 percent of employees and production in Russia.  BLASI, supra  note
*, at 25.
90   In 1995 a few large, rich firms such as oil and gas companies, were privatized
(continued...)
Before firms were privatized, they went through an intermediate step called
“corporatization,” in which the enterprise was formally created as an incorporated
business unit with a separate legal identity, a board of directors, senior
management and a notional economic value ascribed to its assets.85  When a firm
was corporatized, the state owned 100 percent of its stock, but central ministries
lost day-to-day control.  During this pre-privatization stage, boards of directors
explicitly divided control among the general director who received two votes,
rank-and-file workers who received one vote, and the local and federal
governments who each received a vote.86  The employees elected the senior
management during this period, but employees rarely exercised their power in
anything but the most nominal sense.  By cooperating with or intimidating the
workers, managers positioned themselves to keep control of the firm at
privatization.
b.  Management-Employee Buyout Disguised as Stock Ownership. –
Russia’s mass privatization program of 1992-94 transferred more than 15,000
medium and large state firms to private ownership87 with “a speed that is quite
unprecedented in the postcommunist world.”88  These firms employed over 17
million workers and managers and included the bulk of the Russian industrial
core,89 except for a few categories of firms, including energy, defense, and
infrastructure.90   By 1996, when the big wave of privatization was over, 77.2
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through a controversial “loan for shares” program that handed shares over to a number of
financial-industrial groups controlled by new private tycoons.  
91 BLASI, supra  note *, at 25.  The totals now are higher: 4600 mainly small and
medium enterprises underwent some form of privatization in 1996.  Transition Indicators
for the Russian Federation, EBRD TRANSITION REPORT , Nov. 3, 1997, at 195 available in
Nexis Library, Curnws File.
92 WDR, supra  note *, at 5.    Insiders had several privatization options.  About one
quarter of enterprises chose option 1, which gave minority employee ownership for free.
About three quarters of firms chose option 2, which allowed managers and workers to
acquire 51 percent of the firm for extremely low prices (and therefore take formal control of
the firm).  A third option attracted only 2 percent.  This option allowed a management
buyout on the promise of reaching particular restructuring targets.  BLASI, supra  note *, at
41.
93 WDR, supra  note * at 55, Frydman, et. al, supra  note * at 189.
94 Paul Funder Larsen, Buying Land is Next Hurdle for Private Firms, MOSCOW
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1996 (“Many companies seeking to get a clearer title to their land still face
stiff resistance from regional authorities who see land ownership as a source of power in
dealing with local enterprises.”).  This  is reported to be a declining problem in the big cities
but is still serious in the rest of the country.
percent of medium and large state enterprises were privatized accounting for 88.3
percent of industrial output.91
At the time of privatization, most issuers chose an option whereby a
majority of their shares went to three groups of insiders: issuer management, the
issuer labor force, and regional governmental agencies.  The government decision
to give firms this option involved following the path of least political resistance,
giving a continuing stake to each group that had significant power running the firm
prior to privatization.  Although the mass privatization used vouchers and formally
created open stock ownership, the program “was basically a management-
employee buyout program because of its preferential treatment of managers and
workers.”92  After insiders bought shares, each citizen could bid for some of the
remaining shares at auctions using vouchers they were given.  Immediately after
privatization, insiders undertook additional share purchases on the open market
and typically ended up owning about two-thirds of the shares of firms.  On
average, managers owned 9 percent and workers about 56 percent.93  Outsiders
used vouchers to buy about 20 to 30 percent, split between investment funds and
individual investors.  The government retained the remainder of shares, and even
more importantly, it often retained control of the land on which enterprises are
located.94
Post-privatization, senior managers used numerous mechanisms to thwart
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95 Carole Landry, Russia’s Communist Bosses Are On The Way Out, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 15, 1994 (“‘Old guard managers, who supported privatization in exchange for
assurances that they would keep their jobs and full array of perks are desperately fighting
back.  Some managers physically threaten challengers at shareholder meetings, rig
shareholder votes or illegally change corporate charters,’ [Andrei] Shleifer and [Dmitry]
Vasilyev said.”); Peter Galuszka & Patricia Kranz, Look Who’s Making a Revolution:
Shareholders, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 20, 1995 (“new tricks . . . range from diluting the
ownership stake of investors to such simple ploys as erasing the names of outside
investors from computerized shareholder lists”).
96 Frydman, et. al, supra  note * at 204.
97 A reporter notes:
Most Russian enterprises are still run by red directors – former communists who
stack their boards with old-regime subordinates or cronies, bully workers into
selling their shares back to management, and deny outside shareholders access
to their books, boardrooms, and shop floors.  Many consolidate control of their
companies by issuing large blocks of new shares to company insiders, often at
bargain basement prices.
Patricia Kranz, Shareholders at the Gate, BUSINESS WEEK, June 2, 1997, at 60.
98 “If [directors] see outside shareholders trying to get hold of their company, these
managers often shout down their proposals at meetings, intimidate employees who side
with them and hold tight to the board – which is often still considered a Soviet-era workers’
council. . . .  Most employee shareholders, . . . are still passive and exert little influence over
corporate governance because they are underrepresented on company boards.”  Natasha
Mileusnic, The Great Boardroom Revolution, MOSCOW TIMES, July 16, 1996.
the power of employees and outsiders and to maintain control.  These mechanisms
included, for example, keeping share registries locked up in their offices and
refusing to acknowledge ownership by people they disfavored, threatening to fire
workers who sold shares to outsiders, and stock dilutions aimed at reducing the
power (as well as the financial claims noted earlier) of outsider shareholders.95
They also provided little or no disclosure about the business operations or finances
of their firms.  Even voucher investment funds, which are the most aggressive and
informed outside shareholders, often cannot get rudimentary information about the
firms in which they hold shares and instead “resort to spying on their own
companies.”96  Thus, managers did not acquire a majority of shares during the
initial privatization, but they locked up nearly unshakeable control.97  Workers,
who did acquire majority shareownership, did not achieve anything like a “workers
democracy.”  Instead, they remained locked in an uneasy arrangement with
management, often able to block restructuring but not able to seize control.
Among the many reasons for continued employment of redundant labor, managers
sometimes kept employees to prevent them from selling shares to outsiders.98  If
managers fired workers, they could no longer use the threat of job loss to deter
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99 WDR, supra  note *, at 55.
100 BLASI, supra  note *, at 99.
101 BLASI, supra  note *, at 99.
102 See Bernard  Black  & Reinier  Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate
Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996); BLASI, supra  note *, at 98.
103 Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, [cite].
104 While amendments keep being introduced to close loopholes, they do not appear
to be effective. Katy Daigle, Bill Improves Shareholder Rights in Russia, MOSCOW TIMES,
July 14, 1998:
[C]ritics said the legislation fails to attack the real problem – insider dealing – and
doubt anything but better information disclosure requirements and an
understanding of basic ethics will help the situation.  In Russia, company
directors and managers are routinely accused of insider dealing, which includes
everything from accepting bribes to acting against their company’s interests to
selling assets or shares to relatives or friends.
Id.  Insider dealing is not limited to management, but also includes deals in favor of local
governments and labor.  See, e.g., Stephanie Baker-Said, Watchdog Gives Not to MGTS
(continued...)
share sales.
c.  The Persistent Pattern of Initial Privatization. – The effects of the
initial privatization are persistent.  Insider ownership is declining slightly: dropping
from 65 percent in 1993 to about 56 percent in 1995,99 but the problems of
majority insider ownership remain endemic.  By 1996, the typical board contained
four managers, one state representative, and two outside shareholders.100
Because five directors were required to make decisions, the insiders and the state
representative could always prevail, if they cooperated.101
The 1996 corporate law was intended to respond precisely to the problem
of insider domination that emerged from the initial privatization scheme and
immediate post-privatization enterprise behavior.102  For example, the new
corporate law attempted to improve the position of minority outside shareholders
by mandating cumulative voting.  As a result, outside owners of share blocks are
increasingly able to get themselves elected to the board of directors, despite
resistance by insiders to the cumulative voting rule.  In turn, Roman Frydman &
Andrzej Rapaczynski show that outsider representation on the board has had
some positive effect on firm performance.103  Also, significant transactions in which
insiders are interested are supposed to be approved by the outside shareholders.
Nevertheless, insiders have found numerous mechanisms to circumvent the
protections apparently offered by the 1996 reforms and effect non pro-rate
distributions.104
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Floatation, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 22, 1998 (“Moscow City Telephone Network, or MGTS,
is planning to increase its authorized capital by 50 percent, handing the shares over to a
single shareholder linked to the Moscow city government for next to nothing.”).
105 For example, in Moscow, “This cozy relationship is multiplied a thousand times.
According to many business people, [Moscow Mayor] Luzhkov used property as leverage.
The property was leased for a nominal sum, but the city also made unwritten demands not
in the lease: to plant trees, rebuild a hospital, pave a highway.”  David Hoffman, The Man
Who Rebuilt Moscow: Capitalist Style Could Propel Mayor to National Power, WASH.
POST, Feb. 24, 1997, at A1. 
106 One reporter notes:
The reluctance of many directors to use the stock market for their benefit is a
paradox: After all, an overwhelming majority of directors managed to grab sizeable
portions of equity in their companies during the wild privatization years of 1993
and 1994, usually by buying out swathes of shares with the help of cheap bank
loans through a highly abused process known as closed subscription.  Were
directors to understand the virtue of shareholder value, they could help make
themselves even richer.
Gary Peach, 1997 an Outstanding Year Despite Market Nervousness, MOSCOW TIMES, Jan.
13 1998.
107 Neither CEOs Nor Red Directors, The Managers of Russia’s Privatized Industrial
Firms, RUSSIA EXPRESS BRIEFING, Dec. 9, 1996.
d.  The Enduring Cost of Insider Ownership. – To summarize, we
observe three interrelated failures in Russia that are associated with the initial
structure of insider ownership and control.  First, the three groups of insiders have
been unable to work together to operate their firms in a way that would maximize
even their own joint benefit.  They have tended to view their shares more as
control rights than as financial instruments.  Each group has, despite privatization,
continued to focus primarily on how its firm could be run in a way that would most
benefit it directly.  Management extracts extensive perquisites and sweetheart
business deals for themselves and associates.  Labor ensures continued
employment of redundant workers.  Regional government entities continue
receiving public services for the community.105  Each group goes along to get
along; they agree to meet each other’s minimal demands in exchange for getting a
share.  But these insider deals ignore the cumulative effects on the value of the firm
for themselves and for outsider shareholders.106  One Russian fund manager notes:
“The majority of directors still fear loss of control to an outside investor and have
not yet recognized that a smaller piece of a growing pie is more valuable than
ownership of a dead enterprise.”107
Second, the three groups run the firm in a way that is particularly
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108 Commenting on the aluminum smelting industry, one reporter suggests that,
Since they aren’t now looking to attract capital through share issues, the
companies’ directors are not concerned about plummeting stock prices, and don’t
really care what the market thinks about them.  Aluminum shares last traded
actively in 1994 and 1995, when various insiders were trying to establish control
of smelters during the privatization process.
Mark Whitehouse, The Other Side of the Room, MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997.
109 According to the EBRD Transition Report:
In over 65% of Russia’s 18,000 privatized medium-sized and large firms,
management and employees have majority ownership, whereas non-state
outsiders control only 20% of these companies.  While in the top 100 largest
companies outsiders have an ownership stake well above the average, the wide
dispersion of these shareholdings often ensures a controlling position for the
management.  Insiders typically focus more on maintaining control over their firms
than on restructuring.
Id.
110 “The main source of the expansion of the private sector remains the privatisation
process and the contraction of the state sector. . . . The creation of de novo businesses
continues to lag far behind the pace typical for the central European countries and many
newly established businesses continue to operate in the informal economy.”  EBRD
Transition Report.
111 According to the EBRD Transition Report:
Enterprise restructuring has hitherto been achieved mainly through changes in
(continued...)
disadvantageous to outsider shareholders.108  The primitive state of the Russian
legal system and the general lack of corporate transparency means that outside
shareholders gain no real protection from the fiduciary duties nominally placed on
managers and only weak protection from procedural rules designed to police
interested transactions.  Majority insiders can usually crush what would otherwise
be the only meaningful constraints on their behavior:  the ability of outsiders to vote
out the board and the hostile takeover threat.109
And third, the above failures inside existing firms in turn limit capital market
development, with collateral consequences for both existing and new firms.
Established firms cannot raise new capital through the public sale of new equity;
a particularly grave problem given the primitive state of banking in Russia.  Also,
the resulting lack of vibrancy in the secondary market for insider shares means that
primary and secondary markets do not develop for the shares of new, post
privatization firms.110  This lack of stock market vibrancy also slows outsider
purchases of employee shares and delays the resulting conversion of firms with
majority insider ownership to majority outsider ownership.  The result of these
three failures has been an overall lack of needed restructuring.111
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the product mix, shedding of labour through attrition, expanded use of unpaid
leave or reduced hours.  Deeper restructuring in the form of factory shutdowns,
changes in management, major reorganisations and modernisation is at a very
early stage and is constrained by, among other factors, limited access to
investment resources. Recent evidence suggests that roughly 25% of the
medium-sized and large companies are engaged in serious restructuring, many of
them being members of Financial and Industrial Groups (FIGs).  About half of the
medium-sized and large companies have not as yet undertaken any meaningful
restructuring.
Id.
B.  How Initial Conditions Cause Corporate Governance Failures
This section establishes the causal links between the initial conditions just
described, the corporate governance failures detailed in Part I, and the resulting
harms to the Russian economy.
1.  Peculiar Firm Boundaries and the Failure to Maximize Residuals.
– Poorly defined boundaries render firms with weakly constrained and incentivized
management particularly susceptible to several of the five non residual
maximization pathologies.  To start, consider Pathology 1: continued operation of
a value-destroying firm.  From the moment of privatization, Russia had many such
firms that should have been instantly shut down.  Because of their peculiar
boundaries, these still-born firms made little sense as a way to match location,
assets, workers and product mix – but they often had assets with significant
salvage value, urban land in particular.  Despite the damage they cause to social
welfare, managers of such firms indulge their personal preferences by continuing
firm operations. When land is the salvageable asset, managers can easily avoid
taking the residual maximizing decision, because Russia does not have a well-
developed land market, and so there is no effective way make salient the
opportunity costs of using the land for continued firm operation.
A similar story can be told with respect to Pathology 2, where potentially
viable firms fail to use existing capacity efficiently.  Most Russian firms not
displaying Pathology 1 have a strong potential for displaying this second one.  Cost
minimization is a necessary condition for residual maximization.  By definition, what
made these firms borders peculiar was the fact that they were not transaction cost
minimizing, so by definition, firms in this second category require major
restructuring.  Unlike managers of firms in the first category, it is not self evident
why loosely constrained managers of these firms would avoid restructuring and
operate their firm in a non-residual maximizing way.  However, the story told
below of bargaining failures among the insider groups suggests that, in a large
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112 Irrationality may be a problem here too.  In one odd report, “one company director
. . . owned over 51 percent of a company, . . . yet took personal bribes of about $10,000 to
push through decisions that robbed the company of millions.  Obviously, this man doesn’t
understand what he’s doing.”  Katy Daigle, Bill Improves Shareholder Rights in Russia,
MOSCOW TIMES, July 14, 1998.
number of cases, managers may have reason to avoid restructuring, thus dooming
their firms to long-term display of Pathology 2.
The peculiar borders of Russian firms have also made them more prone to
Pathology 3.  This pathology is more likely to occur with an enterprise
encompassing an unnecessarily large number of different activities: if the cash flow
from one activity is sufficiently great that it exceeds the positive net present value
projects arising out of that activity, then the managers are likely to invest the
surplus in negative net present value projects associated with other firm activities.
If the two activities were split into different firms, the cash flow would more likely
be paid out as dividends and investors would have the chance to fund projects
with more promising returns.
Finally, compared with outside investors facing a fragmented set of single
purpose firms, the management of an enterprise encompassing an unnecessarily
large number of activities will – because of their distance from the idea sources and
the rigidity of internal communications channels – also likely have more difficulty
identifying positive net value projects.  Thus the peculiar boundaries of Russian
firm also aggravated the effects of Pathology 4.
2.  Insider Dominance and the Failure to Maximize Residuals.  
a. The Nature of the Failure and the Need for a Credible Promise. –
After privatization, most Russian firms were majority owned by three groups of
insiders: management, employees and regional governmental authorities.  At first
glance, this ownership pattern would appear to offer many advantages and solve
several firm-level problems.  Management’s large stake, typically over 20% of
what are often very large enterprises, should have led to a substantial identification
with the interests of shareholders, while not being so large as to provide an
insuperable barrier to takeover.112  The stake of employees should have
substantially helped some of the contracting problems associated with long-term
employment relationships – such as encouraging asset specific human capital
investments by employees – and should have significantly reduced resistance to
needed downsizing (by offering implicit compensation through increased share
value).  More importantly, when the stakes of the three groups were taken
together, they typically had a right to receive seventy percent or more of the
residuals.  Thus they had huge incentives to agree that the firm itself should be
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113 See, for example, Brent Homstrom & Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and
Performance Monitoring, 101 J. POL. ECON. 678 (1993).  
operated in a fashion that maximizes these residuals. Yet, as we will see, the
structure of ownership and control has actually worked in the opposite direction,
contributing to the failure to maximize residuals.
Traditionally, the choice between public and private ownership has been
seen as involving a tradeoff.  Public ownership leads to a lower cost of capital
because the firm’s shares can be sold for a higher price due to their liquidity and
capacity to be part of a diversified portfolio.  Public ownership also permits a
degree of outside monitoring.113  Private ownership, however, greatly reduces the
substantial residual reducing agency costs of management that are associated with
public firms.  
 At first glance, Russian firms have an ownership structure that would
appear to come close to that of a private firm and hence they should do well at
maximizing their residuals.  A large portion of the shares not owned by
management are owned by just two other entities – the workers and government.
This, one should expect, would radically reduce the transaction costs and
collective action problems associated with shareholder monitoring and action that
plague the public firm.  But Russian firms are falling far short of maximizing their
residuals, suggesting that they are suffering instead from the worst of both worlds.
They do not seem to be getting the benefits of a private ownership structure.  Yet,
the existence of insider control combined with weak corporate law makes raising
capital by public sale of equity impractical and so they are not receiving the
traditional benefits of public ownership either.
The three groups of insiders appear to have been unable to work together
to operate their firms in a way that would come close to maximizing their own joint
benefit.  Their actions suggest that they continue view their shares more as control
rights than as financial instruments.  Therefore, each group has, despite
privatization, continued to focus primarily on how each firm could be run in a way
that would most benefit it directly.  Managers make sweetheart business deals for
themselves and their associates; labor insists on continued employment of
redundant workers; regional government entities demand that firms provide public
services even though the firms are rarely the least cost providers. These behaviors
are major deviations from the decisions that would maximize the firm’s residuals.
By failing to cooperate through good corporate governance, the insiders fail to
capture the potentially large financial value of their shares.  The aggregate benefit
to these three groups from these deviations is less than the resulting diminution in
the residuals.  Management’s gain from the sweetheart contracts is less than the
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114 The reader may raise two questions here.  The first is that the failure of insiders
to come to these deals may be intimately related to the delay because the insiders may have
very high rates of time discount and hence receiving benefits now is preferred to receiving
larger benefits later.  The answer to this, however, is that the Coasian bargain that we are
contemplating already takes such discounts into account.  Efficient operation of the firm
contemplates that the residuals be discounted to present value.
The second question concerns whether  an insider could avoid the delay problem by
selling its shares to others.  But this does not make the problems associated with delay go
away, the buyer instead must suffer them.  If delay also implies uncertainty as to whether
the gain will ever in fact be received, the buyer will pay commensurately less for the shares,
in this regard, the insider is just as badly off as if he had held onto the shares.
price improvement or other advantages of using the suppliers and purchasers
chosen on an arm’s length basis.  Labor’s gain from wages and benefits superior
to whatever redundant workers could obtain in alternative employment is less than
the reduced residuals enjoyed by the firm as result of their continued employment.
Government’s savings from not having to pay other suppliers of services is less
than the cost to the firm of providing these services, which would be outside the
boundaries of the firm if it were operated in a transaction cost minimizing fashion.
Explaining why insiders do not agree to maximize the firm’s residuals as
part of an obvious Coasian bargain starts with the observation that there is a
difference between when insiders receive benefits from their shareholdings
under existing arrangements and when they would receive their benefits
under any kind of bargain to run the firm to maximize its residuals.  Under
the current arrangement, the insiders receive their benefits immediately, as they are
generated by the firm’s ongoing operation.  Under a residual maximizing bargain,
they would  receive them later, in the form of shareholder distributions.114  This
delay is significant:  a deal is not possible unless management is able to make
a credible promise that it will live up to its end of the bargain.  Otherwise
labor and local government would be put in a position of having to give up their
benefits now without an assurance that management, which runs the corporation
day to day, would live up to its end of the bargain:  giving up its particular special
benefits and subsequently distributing the gains from the overall deal as dividends.
b.  The Difficulty in Making the Promise Credible. – Under current
conditions in Russia, management would find it almost impossible to make credible
a promise to live up to its end of the bargain.
i.  Legal enforcement.  One way that a promise can be credible is if the
promisee can easily and economically use the courts to gain the promisor’s
compliance or obtain damages.   For a number of reasons,  labor and local
government are unlikely to be able to do so.  The first step in a promise being
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Article 71(1). 
116 See, for example, Revised Model Business Corporation Act Sec. 8.30.
117 See WILLIAM CARY AND MELVIN EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS CASES AND
MATERIALS, 647-809 (7th ed. 1995).
118 See FLJSC Article 71(2) and Article 71(5).  It is not clear that injunctive relief,
whereby a court invalidates such transactions or orders they not be undertaken, is even
available to shareholders as a formal matter.
119 Black & Kraakman, supra  note *, at 1914.
made credible through the availability of court enforcement is the existence of a
legal obligation on the part of the promisor.  As a formal matter, Russian managers
may be bound to maximize residuals and distribute them pro-rata even without an
explicit deal with other insiders, but this is not clear as a matter of law.  The
Russian corporate code nominally imposes on the management of joint stock
companies the obligation to act in the interests of the company reasonably and in
good faith.115  The language of this obligation is similar to the statutory provisions
for fiduciary duties under U.S. corporate law,116 which are interpreted as banning
extensive perquisites and prohibiting transactions between the corporation and
management or its associates unless the transactions offer the firm terms as good
as can be obtained in an arm’s length deal.117  There is essentially no judicial gloss,
however, to affirm that this language would be interpreted in the same way in
Russia. 
The second step is the actual availability of court enforcement.  Russian law
again nominally provides for a form of derivative suit for damages in the event of
a breach of management’s statutorily imposed obligations.118  Even if we assume
that as a formal matter management is obliged to behave in the fashion
contemplated by the Coasian bargain hypothesized here,  labor and local
government are unlikely to be able to use the courts to stop violations of that
obligation, however.  According to Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, “In
Russia ... courts function slowly if at all, some judges are corrupt, and many are
Soviet-era holdovers who neither understand business nor care to learn.  Better
judges and courts will emerge only over several decades, as the old judges die or
retire.”119
Another possible way of gaining managerial compliance while relying less
on the court system is through legal regulation of the corporation’s own process
of transaction authorization.  Russian law has procedural rules designed to make
less likely the authorization of  transactions in which management or a major
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122 In theory, such persons, pursuant to FLJSC Article 82, are required to disclose
this  information to the company’s board, inspector and  auditors.  There is no obvious
incentive for such persons to comply with this provision, however.  Even if they do, it is
not clear that the information would become available to anyone who possessing it might
act to challenge the transaction for lack of compliance with the approval procedures.  It was
the experience of the authors, in connection with an interested transaction involving one
of Russia’s largest oil companies, that this information was not available, either because
the insiders did not comply with Article 82 or because the company did not make the
information public.
123 It was also the experience of the authors in connection with an interested
transaction involving one of Russia’s largest oil companies that the public records of the
directors meeting and the shareholder’s meeting at which the transaction was approved did
not reveal who voted for and against the transaction.  
shareholder is interested and that are disadvantageous to the corporation.  These
rules require that such transactions be approved by the vote of a majority of those
directors who are not interested in the transaction or, in certain cases, by a
disinterested majority share vote.120  Special procedural rules apply also to the
approval of very large transactions.  The theory is that these rules require much
less court intervention to be effective because  the factual determination of whether
or not there has been compliance is sufficiently simple and clear as to make the
rules nearly “self-enforcing.”  In the end these rules too may not be much help,
however.121  To show that management or a major shareholder is interested in a
transaction requires proving that it is associated in some specified way with the
other party to the transaction.  A general lack of transparency concerning who
owns the shares of, or has managerial positions in,  the corporations involved
makes this proof difficult.122  Even when this is accomplished, it is hard to know
whether the pattern of votes cast in fact conform with the procedural requirements,
in part because of these same transparency problems and in part because of
difficulties in determining who voted which way.123
ii.  Reputation.  Another way that a promise can be credible is where the
promisor has a prior reputation for keeping its promises in situations in which legal
enforcement is difficult and the non-legal consequences - other than damage to
reputation - would not have been expected to be great.  Such a promisor is
unlikely to breach the promise in question because doing so debases its reputation,
which is costly.  The problem in Russia is that in the few years since privatization
the management of the typical corporation has not had the time to develop such
a reputation, at least with respect to promises of this magnitude.  
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While the same management team may have been in place for a significant
time prior to privatization, the team, and all those it dealt with, were  subject to
strict ministerial supervision.  Because of this, the need for promises was less and
the non reputation-related negative consequences of breaching the promises that
were made was greater.  Adding to these negative consequences was the fact that
most promises were made with persons where there was an ongoing course of
dealing.  
An additional problem here is that the promise that management needs to
make runs contrary to the norm for managerial behavior in Russia.  A person who
makes a particular promise that he has not made before, but where the behavior
promised is the norm, is likely to be credible if over time she has fulfilled other
promises that conform to the norm with respect to other kinds of behavior.  Such
a person is viewed as a “regular fellow” or a “straight shooter.”  Where the
behavior promised runs contrary to the norm, such a reputation is of no help.
iii. Hostages.  A third way a promise can be made credible is where the
promisor gives the promisee a “hostage” that can be taken by the promisee if the
promisee feels that there has been a breach.  The ideal hostage is something that
is worth much less to the promisee than the promisor. A firm’s plant might serve
this kind of hostage function if it were vulnerable to certain kinds of labor actions,
for example a sit-in.   Labor is poorly organized in Russia, however, and so
collective action problems make it unlikely that it would be able to use the plant in
this fashion.  Such actions also would likely be repressed by governmental
authorities.  Any promise by management to waive its rights to such governmental
assistance would have its own credibility problems.
iv. The need for ex post verification.  None of these ways of making a
promise credible will work unless there is some method of ascertaining whether the
promise has been kept or not. This is another serious obstacle to the parties
making their Coasian bargain requiring management to use its control to maximize
residuals and then distribute them pro-rata.  In terms of ex post verification,
management is in the same position making this promise to labor and government
as it would be making this promise to any non-control outside shareholder.  The
whole apparatus of modern auditing and accounts is designed to provide a
reasonable assessment of the amount of residuals that have been generated, to
identify the amount of spending for management compensation and perquisites, to
ferret out corporate transactions in which management is interested, to identify
which investors receive how much in distributions, and to highlight outright theft.
Application of this apparatus to Russian corporations is in its infancy and so most
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A barrier to action by outsiders is the information vacuum that prevails in many
insider-held firms.  They all try to look poor.  The only real books are in the
director’s safe, or his head.  It’s hard even to know which firms are worth taking
over.  Once a successful bid is made, one Russian consultant described the
takeover itself in virtually military terms: Advance spies must learn what safes and
computers hold the key files.  On takeover day, armed guards must secure all of
these within minutes or the data, and the cash behind them, will simply vanish.
All physical assets must be nailed down or nothing will be left but an empty shell.
These are little details foreign investors don’t always understand, noted the
consultant.  
Edwin Dolan, Resisting Shock of New, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 8, 1997.
remain far from transparent.124
c.  The Lack of Strong Capital Markets. – Along with the inability of
management to make credible promises, the absence of strong capital markets
(itself a result of widespread corporate governance failures) frustrates the parties
making a Coasian deal to maximize residuals.  Even if workers were able to obtain
what they believe to be a credible promise from management, they would have
great difficulty selling for cash today their rights to receive in the future the benefits
of the deal.  This is an important additional complication since the desperate living
conditions of many Russian workers, combined with a belief that the future could
not be worse and might be better, may give them a strong positive time preference
– an illustration of the difficulty of making social welfare evaluations of decisions
involving the allocation of resources over time when capital markets fail.  If
discounting to present value is done at the interest rate implied by the strong
positive time preference of highly credit constrained workers, managers of Russian
firms may be running them in ways that suddenly appear far more efficient.
d.  Applicability to Different Pathologies.  Understanding the bargaining
dynamics among competing inside owners of privatized Russian firms helps explain
the widespread incidence in Russia of Pathologies 2 and 3, the failure to use
existing capacity efficiently and the misinvestment of internally generated cash
flows.  The preference of labor shareholders to retain redundant workers rather
than maximize residuals leads directly to Pathology 2.  There are two ways that the
firm can keep employment high in the short run.  One is to produce more output
than would be called for if the firm set marginal cost equal to marginal revenue.
The other is to produce this level of output using a combination of inputs that
includes more labor than would the cost minimizing input combination. Both
decisions involve failures to use existing capacity as efficiently as possible and both
reduce residuals as a consequence.  The labor shareholders’ desire to retain
redundant workers also leads to Pathology 3.  While firm investment in negative
[October 25, 1999 draft]                  LESSONS FROM FIASCOS 44
125 Paul Funder Larsen, Buying Land is Next Hurdle for Private Firms, MOSCOW
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1996.
net present value projects is not necessary for employment to be maximized in the
current period, it is for employment to be maximized in the future (assuming that
the new investment does not embody a radically labor-saving new technology).
This is true whether the investment replaces worn out existing capacity or
represents an actual expansion of capacity.  Labor’s interest here parallels
managers’ personal interests in running as large an enterprise as possible,
everything else being equal.  
The bargaining dynamics story is not as helpful in explaining Pathology 1.
The residual maximizing change necessary for firms displaying Pathology 1 is to
close them immediately.  As we have seen in Part I, to the extent that an
unreformable value destroying firm continues operating because of corporate
governance problems, it is because the firm has cash reserves (unlikely in Russia)
or salvageable assets.  The Coasian deal here would be to close the firm as soon
as these assets could be sold.  There is no time delay requiring a credible promise
on the part of management, and hence none of the problems discussed above
should block the deal.  
How then can the existence of firms displaying Pathology 1 be explained?
One possibility is that such firms do not exist, that we have created a category with
an empty set.  The anecdotal evidence presented here, however, suggests that this
is not the case.  Another possibility is that title to these salvageable assets, at least
in the case of land, is not as clear as we have portrayed it, in particular that local
authorities have the power to block land sales independent of the powers they
have as shareholders.125  If so, the needed reform is in property law and public
law, not improved corporate governance.  Yet another possibility is that the
market for such salvageable assets is extremely illiquid due to severe limitations in
capital markets generally in Russia.  Thus existing Pathology 1 firms will gradually
be shut down as buyers are found who will pay full value for the assets, but that
the process will take considerable time.  If that is the case, the initial conditions
explain the problem not by their direct effects on the Pathology 1 firms, but by their
contribution to the failure of corporate governance in Russia generally with that
failure’s attendant deadening of Russian capital markets.  Finally, Pathology 1 firm
Coasian deals may not be made because of perceptual problems on the part of
labor.  Labor may believe that the redundant jobs they wish to save are worth
more to them than is really the case.  The shareholder distribution that labor would
receive upon sale of the salvageable asset would then not seem to labor to be
worth the loss of these jobs.  If this is the case, however, it would form an
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additional (or alternative) explanation for the failure of the Coasian bargain in the
cases of firms displaying Pathologies 2 and 3 as well. 
The failed Coasian bargain story also does not explain very well
Pathologies 4 and 5. These pathologies involve failures of suitability and capability,
not conscious decisions by mangers to put their personal interests above that of
firm residual maximization.  In essence, managers of firms displaying these
pathologies are doing as well as they can, but a firm with less risk averse or more
imaginative managers could do better.  The problem is thus not the result of
competing insiders unable to make a Coasian bargain.  The social welfare effects
of these failures would be corrected either by replacing the incumbent managers
or by assuring that there are other venues for implementing the positive net present
value projects being rejected or unrecognized by these managers.  The failings
here are in the market for corporate control and the market to provide capital for
new firms.  Thus again, the initial conditions help explain the Pathologies 4 and 5
not directly, but by their contribution to the failure of corporate governance in
Russia generally and the attendant deadening  of Russian capital markets.  
3.  Insider Dominance and Non Pro-Rata Distributions.– Initial
conditions in the form of insider dominance also can help explain the massive
failure of Russian firms to distribute their residuals pro-rata to their investor
owners.  The primitive state of the Russian legal system and the general lack of
corporate transparency means that outside shareholders gain no real protection
from the fiduciary duties nominally placed on managers and only weak protection
from procedural rules designed to police interested transactions.  Privatization, as
we have seen, resulted in most firms having the insiders in the majority.  This
crushes what would otherwise be the only remaining meaningful constraints on
these insiders’ behavior:  the ability of outsiders to vote out the board and the
hostile takeover threat. 
Initial conditions also play a role, though more indirectly, in the non pro-rata
distributions by firms where the insiders have less than a majority of shares but
managers still control the firm.  In theory, these managers would at least be subject
to being thrown out by the vote of the majority outsiders or as a result of a hostile
tender offer.  Shareholder votes have huge collective action problems associated
with them, however, and as for hostile tender offers, the same story applies here
as discussed just above.  The initial conditions, by their effect on corporate
governance among Russian firms generally, have done severe damage to the
creation of vital capital markets generally.  Thus no effective market for corporate
control has developed and the hostile takeover check against non pro-rata
distributions by majority outsider owned firms is really a chimera.  
It is worth considering the other causal factors of non pro-rata distributions
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as well, and here the governance failure typology is quite useful.  For example, of
all the pathologies, Pathology 6, diversion of claims, is perhaps most amenable to
traditional law reform efforts, at least in some of the pathology’s forms.  Perhaps
registering transfers of shares could be centralized in a public or quasi-public
institution rather than left to the whims of individual firm managers.  Particular
loopholes in the corporate law, such as those regarding convertible bonds, can be
tightened; standards of review in bankruptcies can be adjusted.  But even here,
when so much is at stake, insiders may be able to invent ever more subtle
diversion mechanisms.  For example, many of the procedural protections available
to shareholders depend on identifying outside disinterested owners, and requiring
a majority of their votes for important changes in corporate structure.  Recent
proposals attempt to strengthen these key protections.126  But insiders have proven
adept at obscuring the identity of owners and evading these procedural protections
with ostensibly outside owners actually controlled by insiders.  
Pathology 7, diversion of assets, is not as amenable to simple law reform
efforts, even assuming that it became easier for shareholders to obtain judgments
and enforce them.  Even the Delaware Chancery, presumably the most
sophisticated court in the world for detecting breaches of the duty of loyalty, has
a difficult time separating out management decisions that are legitimately taken to
increase residuals but have the incidental effect of disproportionately benefitting
insiders, from management decisions primarily motivated by a management desire
to effect a non pro-rata distribution.  It will be a long time before Russian courts
are likely to achieve Delaware’s level of competence.  As for the more blatant
examples of non pro-rata distributions, they are usually criminal and implicate a
broad array of institutional and legal deficiencies in Russia.  These deficiencies
include the refusal of local officials to recognize, in their role as enforcers of
property rights, decisions of legitimate corporate processes when these decisions
run contrary to the desires of incumbent managers.   
C.  Trends in Corporate Control
1.  Dynamics of Initial Ownership Patterns. – The original allocation of
shares at the time of privatization is not a sustainable ownership pattern over time.
Many firms have already been taken over completely by one group of insiders,
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usually the managers, who purchase the shares of the other insiders.  This is a
predictable result because the multiple groups of insiders are unable to make joint
wealth maximizing agreements.  When managers take complete control, they can
operate the corporate assets more as if the assets were their sole private property.
This is a more stable ownership pattern and it represents a social gain because the
managers are more motivated to put assets to their first best uses.  
The management control equilibrium is still far from ideal, however, and its
shortcomings represent large continued failings in the Russian system of corporate
governance.  First, the deals necessary to buy out the other insiders are not easy
to make because management itself has no ready access to capital.  Often their
aims are achieved by extra-legal means.  Thus, the new equilibrium will take
considerable time to reach and often does not put assets, at least immediately after
the ownership restructuring, in the hands of the persons most capable of using
them.  The stakes are especially big because these assets include control over cash
flows that the managers often cannot invest sensibly within their own firms, but
capital market failures mean cash flows are denied to other entrepreneurs who
could make better use of them.  These failures, as we have seen, stem from the
continued ability of insiders to divert wealth from any remaining outside
shareholders, which makes raising capital through public sales of equity by any firm
virtually impossible.  Given the paucity of other sources of capital, many promising
investment opportunities go unfunded.  Moreover, the absence of outside investor
voice in the affairs of the firm may mean that it is not efficiently run even to the
extent that doing so is now in the best interests of the management insiders.  These
managers are often still holdovers from the communist era and would be able to
act more in their own and society’s best interests if prodded by more market-
oriented outsiders, but their continued desire to engage in non pro-rata distribution
makes such consciousness-raising advice inadvisable to obtain.
Early empirical work suggests that the best improvement in corporate
performance in Russia comes when firms have substantial outside ownership and
those owners place outside directors on the board.127  This observation may be
causally backward, in that outsiders tend to invest in the best firms, particularly
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those that are generating sufficient positive cash flow that payment of dividends
becomes possible.  The question is whether the privatized enterprises can
systematically move in the direction of increasing outsider ownership and control.
The analysis in the sections above, suggests cause for concern.  When multiple
insiders block each other, there is little commitment by insiders to the financial
aspects of share ownership.  Similarly, when manager insiders take control and
divert assets illegally, outside investors have little incentive to purchase minority
interests.
Privatization is intended to create wealth that is available for reinvestment
in Russia, but the insider structure of corporate ownership may instead stimulate
capital flight.  Diversifying risk through portfolio investment in domestic firms is
impossible.  Domestic equity investments, to be worthwhile, must be in control
amounts under the current system.  A system that starts with fragmented insider
ownership has led to one where public offerings are impossible and capital leaves
Russia in part because of inadequate viable investment opportunities.
2.  Evolution of Financial Industrial Groups. – For a short period,
Russia seemed to be moving to a system of corporate control concentrated in
huge, sprawling conglomerates that came to be known as financial-industrial
groups (FIGs), organized around one of seven chief oligarchs, each with a captive
bank, a holding company, and multiple privatized companies as subsidiaries.128
The most significant boon for the FIGs occurred in 1995 with the infamous “loans-
for-shares” scheme in which the oligarchs gave relatively small loans to the
government to plug the budget deficit and in exchange received as collateral
security interests in shares of the most valuable Russian resource-extracting firms:
oil, minerals, timber, and so on.  When the government did not pay back the loans,
the oligarchs conducted rigged auctions through which the collateral on the loans
became controlling shareownership in these firms.129  One oligarch, Vladimir
Potanin, in discussing the loan-for-shares program, noted, “It was bad.  The prices
were cheap.  We can stop discussing this.  It was bad.  But it did solve the
problem of having more efficient owners.”130  According to one estimate, the chief
oligarchs, through their FIGs, were said to control 40 percent of Russia’s
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economy.  The seven “grey cardinals,”131 however, rather than each working to
improve the operations already under his particular control, fought each other to
extend control to additional assets.  This led George Soros to compare Russia to
“a canoe in which seven men are fighting over a horde of gold [and] are too
absorbed by this to recognize they are heading toward a waterfall.”132  The 1998
financial collapse set the FIGs back, bankrupting several of them, and so it is too
early to see if they really put assets in the hands of more efficient owners.  Initial
indications are not promising, though.133
Early in the transition, optimistic commentators argued that the FIGs would
roughly parallel the Japanese experience with keiretsu and Korea with the chaebol.
Another analogy would be Oliver Williamson’s M-form corporation, where the
head office substitutes for the capital market’s capital allocation and managerial
monitoring functions.  Given the extreme weakness of Russian capital markets, this
substitution seemed a step forward.  FIG oligarchs argued that they were relatively
more productive than other sectors of the economy because their captive banks
gave them access to funds at rates much lower than what was generally available,
presumably because of reduced information asymmetries.  And, echoing
Williamson, they argued that “subsidiaries are overseen by group executives at the
center, forcing local managers to pay attention to shareholder value, something that
few other firms in Russia ever consider.”134  According to Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
one of the oligarchs, “the FIGs are an excellent way of distributing scarce
managerial resources throughout the economy.  Surely, you can see that.”135
In practice, the keiretsu and chaebol were not the right analogy; rather the
FIGs more closely resemble the old Soviet nomenklatura networks of former
Communist and Komsomol members;136 FIGs “are to some extent a revival of the
old (Soviet) branch ministries.”137  They have not managed their enterprises under
their control any better than firms generally have in the economy.  Instead,
oligarchs focused on non pro-rata distribution and generally continued to ignore
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Boris Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister and key reform politician attributes the
failure of reform generally to the role of the FIGs.  He says, 
The reason for this crisis is that after seven years of trying to build a market
economy, we’ve ended up with oligarchic capitalism.  It is characterized by the
fact that a few FIGs, which, incidentally, work very inefficiently and are managed
by greedy managers whose main aim is to pump money out of their enterprises
and stockpile it aborad, produce the lion’s share of GDP.
O’Brien, supra  note * (quoting Nemstov).
problems of non residual maximization within the firms they controlled.  According
to one commentator, “The oligarchs were qualified to run banks only because of
their familiarity with the corridors of power.  Uneximbank [one of the FIG banks]
never had any interest in improving manufacturing at any of its companies.  It just
wanted to channel money through the bank.”138   So far, FIGs seem to have
exhibited all the corporate governance pathologies we have already noted, they do
not appear to be a step forward.
3.  Some Reform “Thought Experiments.” – The critical problems we
identify for Russian corporate governance lie at the intersection of uneconomic firm
boundaries and control by competing groups of insiders.  Poorly drawn firm
boundaries exacerbate the corporate governance problems that arise when, as in
Russia, managers are loosely constrained and poor incentivized.  And control by
competing groups of insiders confounds the usual prediction that insider dominated
firms should be good at residual maximization, while it robs outsiders of their only
mechanism for limiting non pro-rata distributions of residuals.  For Russia at least,
the firm borders at the time of initial privitization are “water over the dam” and all
that can be hoped for now is greater development of a market for corporate
assets.  Voting rights, however, are something that can be altered by legal fiat, at
least in theory.  The Russian situation is demonstration of a case where the usual
rationales for “one vote, one share” do not hold.  It would be preferable if the
voting rights of the competing corporate insiders could be sterilized in return
perhaps for an even greater share of equity.  Unless Russia undertakes such a
reform, the best it can hope for is a slow and costly transition to a low-value
equilibrium where outsiders are not available to provide public capital. 
A primarily procedural approach to reform, which does not rely heavily on
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court enforcement, goes some way toward creating a viable corporate governance
regime.139  However, we are skeptical that such reforms alone are going
sufficiently to protect outsiders in a way that makes public equity finance possible
– even after firms have made the transition to management control.  Instead, as just
suggested, we believe that the problems associated with insider blocks requires a
more substantive approach that effectively disenfranchises the initial groups of
insiders.  For example, Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman sensibly suggest
neutralizing the voting rights of local governments which make up one of the
competing blocks of insiders and which are unlikely to use their rights to maximize
shareholder wealth.140  But, the suggestion to sterilize shares of local government
owners applies with equal force to management and labor blocks.  Rules allowing
only outside shareholders to vote could also be used to take control of the board
away from the initial group of insiders and increase the value of being an outside
shareholder.  Insiders with a reduced capacity to engage in non pro-rata
distributions would focus more on the gains to be made from increased share value
if residuals were maximized.  Under such a reform, the shares would regain their
vote when transferred to genuinely outside hands.  
A grand political deal of insider vote sterilization in return for an even
greater share of equity is obviously impractical in the environment of today’s
Russia in part because again, no one would trust the results.  Policing the
independence of outsider shareholders and setting up effective institutions to
aggregate their votes is beyond Russian capabilities today.  Nonetheless, over
time, with the evolution of a somewhat more effective legal system and somewhat
greater corporate transparency, insider vote sterilization might represent a way that
would help Russia move toward a modern capitalist economy that could at least
involve less reliance on these institutions than the bright line procedural approach
that informs the current Russian code.  Such a reform basically would involve
taking the logic of those reforms one step further.  Instead of partially
disenfranchising insiders by requiring disinterested and super-majority votes for a
wide range of corporate actions, insiders would be entirely disenfranchised.  The
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entire focus of the corporate law system could then be on policing the single
question of which supposedly outside shareholders are genuinely independent from
management.  The motives for parties entering the grand political deal would be
the huge gains that better governed corporations could produce.
Another possibility along these lines – equally implausible now but
conceivable in the future – would be to create a mechanism that requires payments
of dividends when certain benchmarks are met by a firm.  Proposals for minimum
dividend payments have been floated in the American context, but could prove
even more useful in the Russian one.  Most importantly, minimum dividend
payments by firms with a certain level of assets or revenues, could help people
come to view shares as financial instruments, rather than just as levers for control.
III.  CONCLUSION
A typology of Russian corporate governance can offer useful lessons for
corporate governance theory.  The rich array of deviant behavior we canvass in
Russia helps flesh out a framework of pathologies that, in a comprehensive way,
links corporate governance failures to real economy effects.  How is this analytic
tool useful?  It helps give more precision to the often vague notion of corporate
governance failures.  Scholars write about the costs of poor corporate governance
without telling us the mechanisms by which loosely constrained and poorly
incentivized managers are causing social welfare losses.  We suggest that in every
economy, those losses may be inflicted in differing degrees through five distinct
pathologies of non maximization of residuals and two versions of non pro-rata
distributions.  Identifying which pathology predominates may help point to more
appropriate corporate governance reforms.
The second focus of the paper – explaining what has caused the flowering
of Russian corporate pathologies – may also prove useful for corporate
governance theory.  Not surprisingly, the existing scholarly literature on
comparative corporate governance mostly reflects the experience of United States,
Western Europe and Japan.  In the United States, it is unusual for a corporation
to maintain a share ownership pattern over the long term that involves a majority
of shares owned by insiders and a minority owned by outsiders who trade their
shares publicly.  Our understanding of the mechanisms that constrain management
to act in relatively share-value-maximizing ways — one share, one vote, the hostile
takeover threat, share price based management compensation schemes, board
elections, shareholder approval of certain interested and extraordinary
transactions, ex post court review, the managerial labor market and other
reputational incentives — is built primarily against the U.S. backdrop because the
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typical American corporation forms the paradigm for theorizing. 
We suggest that looking at Russia introduces an analytic focus not
immediately obvious from studying such long-established systems.  Among other
things, we see concretely that initial conditions matter for subsequent corporate
governance development.  The Russian experience suggests two salient initial
conditions, uneconomic firm boundaries and competing groups of insider owners,
that offer avenues for further research.  At a minimum, the bargaining failures that
followed privatization provide evidence that counsels skepticism towards the
periodic claims of some scholars and activists for including “stakeholders” – such
as labor, the local community and the local government itself – in corporate
governance.   The Russian experience reminds us, also quite starkly, of the
tradeoff between the agency costs of management in a publicly held corporation
and the disadvantages of lack of access to public equity finance.  This tradeoff
appears in the leveraged buyouts of the late 1980s and the “going private” trend
of the early 1970s: firms involved in both movements have tended to go public
again at some later point.
More generally, the Russian experience suggests we rethink how close
corporations operate.  While there is a well-developed jurisprudence of close
corporations in the United States, there is only a modest literature on the
economics of such legal relations.  Governance of the close corporation has
traditionally been viewed by lawyer-economists as a contracting problem among
well-informed, well-represented, motivated individuals, where the best policy
advice that can be given is to have the law not obstruct the deals these individuals
might reach.
The bargaining failures that followed privatization in Russia could shed light
on our own system by focusing attention on the understudied area of losses from
fragmented ownership in close corporations and other special corporate
governance arrangements such as those associated with start-up companies
backed by venture capital.  When insiders exercise their rights so that each blocks
the others, corporate assets may be wasted in a “tragedy of the anticommons.”141
If competing blocks of insiders have incentives each to veto share value-
maximizing decisions, or if the costs of aggregating and negotiating insider interests
to reach such decisions are sufficiently high, then corporate assets may be wasted
in low value uses.  In short, the Russian experience counters recent theoretical and
empirical research which argues that control by multiple large shareholders actually
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improves firm performance.142  
The Russian experience of corporate governance is unique; nowhere else
in the world offers such creative and ample corporate governance pathologies,
nowhere else do firms have such strange boundaries and competing insiders so
much control.  But the lessons that Russia teaches are not parochial at all.  Russia’s
enterprise pathologies improve our basic understanding of how corporate
governance works.
